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Turkey has been battling with terrorist groups since the 1980s. In total, more than 35,000 
Turkish people have been killed by terrorists. The majority of the terrorist activities take 
place near the Turkish-Iraqi border, which is characterized by rough terrain. Problems, 
such as lengthy distances, often prevent aircraft from reaching the area before the 
terrorists achieve their objectives. Limited fuel capacity and challenging geographical 
conditions are other issues that must be overcome. Because of their technical capabilities 
and longer flight times, Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) may enhance 
Turkey’s ability to counter active terrorists in that region. In this research, Map Aware 
Non-uniform Automata (MANA) is used to model different counterterrorism scenarios 
taking place along the Turkish-Iraqi border. We examine the potential effectiveness of 
using UCAVs in conjunction with manned aircraft to detect and eliminate terrorists trying 
to cross the border and attack Turkish military assets. For this purpose, we analyze the 
data from 102,800 simulated air-to-ground attacks using data analysis techniques, such as 
comparison and regression analysis. The analysis shows that UCAVs, with their 
additional sensors on the border and being able to rapidly attack identified targets, are 
very efficient in quickly countering terrorists and preventing them from attacking military 
forces. 
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Terrorism has become a significant problem and threatens many countries. Turkey has 
been dealing with active terrorist groups since the 1980s. In total, excluding those 
unrecorded, more than 35,000 Turkish people have been killed by terrorists. The Turkish-
Iraqi border, which is the focus of this thesis, is characterized by rough geographical 
conditions, deep valleys, and steep mountains. The challenging terrain of the Turkish-
Iraqi border allows terrorist groups to make surprise attacks on military and police 
facilities along the border and then disappear. The dominant terrorist group in the region 
has been the Kurdish Workers’ Party (PKK). 
This thesis focuses on the methods that the Turkish Air Force uses to detect and 
eliminate terrorists. Only the Turkish-Iraqi border is taken into consideration (rather than 
the whole southeastern border of Turkey). The Turkish Air Force has used the methods 
described below to kill terrorists or prevent them from attacking military stations, 
government agencies, and military and police lodgings along the Turkish-Iraqi border. 
After obtaining information and assessing it carefully, the Air Force immediately sends 
manned aircraft to the region to conduct attack missions. Problems, such as lengthy 
distances, often prevent aircraft from reaching the area before the terrorists achieve their 
objectives. Limited fuel capacity and challenging geographical conditions are other issues 
that must be overcome. 
The majority of the problems that Turkey has to overcome are related to limited 
time and challenging terrain. Using unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) in 
southeastern Turkey may help solve some of the problems. UCAVs are weaponized 
unmanned aerial vehicles that can be used for air-to-ground attack missions against active 
terrorists. This thesis analyzes the use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles in conjunction 
with manned aircraft against active terrorists in rough terrain. For this purpose, we 
modeled the entire Turkish-Iraqi border in Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata 
(MANA), an agent-based, time-stepped, stochastic mission-level model. We examine the 
influence of UCAVs against active terrorists by looking at the number of terrorists killed, 
the time required to kill terrorists, and the probability that the terrorists reach their 
 xx 
objective. We also vary the parameters of F-16s, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and 
UCAVs, such as sensor detection ranges, hit probabilities, speed, and reaction times, to 
explore the most effective parameters for mission success. 
We built our scenarios by taking historical incidents as a reference. We are trying 
to figure out how effective UCAVs might be in that area as an alternative to F-16s. For 
this purpose, we constructed eight different air-to-ground attack plans comprising 
combinations of F-16s, UAVs, and UCAVs. We are going to call them different scenarios 
throughout the thesis since each of them needs to be run separately in MANA, one 
baseline and seven alternate scenarios. Our scenarios include three air-to-ground strike 
assets, three UAVs for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions, and 
three terrorist groups that attempt to cross the border and make their way to attack three 
blue battalions. The scenarios also have partisans, who are the supporters of terrorists in 
the cities, and a dummy agent, who is used to terminate the runs. The battle area is 
separated into three regions, and each air-to-ground strike asset, UAV, and terrorist group 
is assigned to a specific region. If a UAV detects and classifies any terrorist activity along 
the border, it immediately reports it to the strike assets that are responsible for that 
specific region. Each UAV and strike asset conducts operations in a dedicated region, and 
they do not have any activity in other regions. The following figure depicts the general 
overlay of the scenarios. 
 
There are three regions along the border. The combination of the air assets by scenario is 
shown on the upper right table. UAVs are used in all scenarios. 
 xxi 
We explore the effects of 28 different factors in this thesis. Among these 28 
factors, 20 are controllable factors and eight are uncontrollable factors. Controllable 
factors include the parameters of F-16s, UCAVs, and UAVs. Uncontrollable factors 
include the parameters of terrorists and partisans. We used a nearly orthogonal Latin 
hypercube (NOLH) design, which provides an efficient design while covering a broad 
section of input space with 257 design points. The NOLH design also guarantees that the 
factors are not confounded. We ran 50 replications for each design point and each 
scenario, and came up with a final data set based on 102,800 air-to-ground attack 
missions. Afterwards, the data was analyzed using data analysis techniques, such as 
comparison, partition trees, and regression analysis. The following list summarizes the 
results of our analysis. 
• The analysis shows that UCAVs, with their additional sensors on the border and 
being able to rapidly attack identified targets, are very efficient in quickly 
countering terrorists and preventing them from attacking military forces. 
• In general, F-16s, with more powerful weapons, are better at inflicting red 
casualties, but UCAVs kill more quickly and are better at preventing the terrorists 
from attacking blue. 
• More specifically, the scenarios where we use two F-16s and one UCAV are more 
advantageous for killing terrorists than the scenarios with one F-16 and two 
UCAVs. On the other hand, the scenarios with two UCAVs are preferable in terms 
of the time to complete the mission and preventing terrorists from reaching their 
goal. 
• The most common conclusion about the factors is that weapons-related variables 
have a strong influence on the number of terrorists killed while sensor-related 
factors are the most effective on the time to counter the terrorists and minimizing 
the probability that terrorists attack blue. 
• The weapon range of an F-16 and a UCAV are the two most influential factors on 
the number of terrorists killed. The sensor classification range of the UAVs have a 
strong effect on the number of terrorists killed, the time to complete the mission, 
and the probability that the terrorists attack reach their goal. 
• The hit probability of an F-16 and a UCAV are two of the most significant factors 
in all of the regression model fits. 
• The range at which the terrorists classify blue is a significant factor for the time to 
complete the mission. 
• Finally, the ranges at which the terrorists and the partisans detect blue have a 
significant influence on the probability that the terrorists attack blue. 
 xxii 
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“Peace at home, peace in the world.” 
– Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
 
Terrorism has become a significant problem and threatens many countries. Many 
countries spend significant amounts of money to protect their citizens from terrorist 
activities. The government of the United States spent more than half a trillion dollars to 
protect against and respond to terrorist activities between September 11, 2001, and  
2012 [1]. Turkey has been dealing with active terrorist groups even longer, since the 
1980s [2]. In total, excluding those unrecorded, more than 35,000 Turkish people have 
been killed by terrorists [3]. This chapter provides information about Turkey’s 
geographical characteristics and challenges surrounding its southeastern border. It also 
describes major terrorist organizations that threaten Turkish citizens and conventional 
forces in that area and provides examples of the most bloody terrorist attacks in Turkey’s 
history. This chapter also provides an explanation about current counterterrorism 
methods and problems that the Turkish Air Force encounters and describes potential 
solutions for these problems. 
A. MOTIVATION 
1. Geography of Turkey and Challenges 
The lands of Turkey are located where Asia meets Europe. The land boundaries of 
Turkey stretch 2,949 kilometers, and coastlines stretch 8,333 kilometers. The country 
shares its borders with the European countries Bulgaria and Greece and the Asian 
countries Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Iran, Iraq, and Syria (Figure 1) [4]. Because 
Turkey holds lands that border both southeastern Europe and southwestern Asia, it has 
been a crossroads country between the two continents. Because of the strategic 
significance of Turkey’s location, legal travelers as well as terrorist groups use it for 
passage and refuge. A majority of anti-Turkey terrorist activities take place in 
southeastern Turkey. Terrorist groups are taking advantage of political and economic 
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instability and regime changes in neighboring countries. Since the beginning of Syria’s 
civil war, around 450,000 Syrian refugees have crossed the Turkish-Syrian border and 
started to live in camps thanks to Turkey’s open-door policy [5]. The Turkish-Iraqi 
border, which is the focus of this thesis, is characterized by rough geographical 
conditions, deep valleys, and steep mountains. The challenging terrain of the Turkish-
Iraqi border allows terrorist groups to make surprise attacks on military and police 
facilities along the border and then disappear. 
Turkey has also been used as a corridor by terrorist groups for smuggling. One of 
the most important money sources of terrorist groups is drug smuggling [6]. Terrorists 
choose Turkey as the first course to transport illegal materials from African and Asian 
countries into Europe. Due to its rugged terrain, terrorist groups opt to use the Turkish-
Iraqi border as a passage for illicit activities. It is difficult for Turkish conventional forces 
to prevent those terrorist groups from committing crimes in that area because of the rough 
terrain. 
 
Figure 1.  Location of Turkey and its neighbors. Image from Worldatlas.com. 
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2. Terrorist Organizations in Turkey 
Turkey has been battling terrorist groups for a long time. According to the 2014 
Global Terrorism Index published by Institute of Economics and Peace, Turkey is one of 
the countries from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) that experienced the highest number of deaths as a result of terrorist attacks [7]. 
Some of the most effective terrorist organizations that threaten Turkey’s southeastern 
borders are the following. 
a. PKK 
The dominant terrorist group in the region has been the Kurdish Workers’ Party 
(PKK). The PKK was founded by Abdullah Ocalan on November 27, 1978. Their main 
objective is to establish an independent Kurdish state within Turkey’s borders through 
communist revolution and armed struggle [8]. Although the PKK’s leader Abdullah 
Ocalan was captured in 1999 and sentenced to life imprisonment after trial, the PKK 
never ended its terrorist activities in Turkey and northern Iraq. After they lost their leader, 
the PKK started to claim that it changed its strategy to peaceful ways. In order to prove 
itself as a legitimate political organization to international countries, the PKK changed its 
name to Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) in April 2002. In 2003, 
the terrorist organization changed its name again to Kurdistan Peoples’ Congress 
(KONGRA-GEL). Despite two name changes and a declaration of policy change, the 
leading members of the PKK did not change. The organization is still led by Abdullah 
Ocalan, who gives directions from prison transmitted to the other members of the 
organization by his lawyers. Also, other leading figures such as Zubeyir Aydar, Murat 
Karayilan, and Cemil Bayik have kept their leading roles in the PKK [8]. They have also 
continued terrorist activities in Turkey. The PKK has also been on the U.S. Department 
of State’s foreign terrorist organizations list since 1997 [9]. In 2010, Europol, a European 
Union Law Enforcement Agency, described the PKK as an ethno-nationalist and 
separatist terrorist group seeking international recognition and political self-determination 
[10]. According to Turkey’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, legal and illegal sources of PKK 
revenue can be listed as follows: 
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• Extortion 
• Revenue from the “special nights” organized by affiliates 
• Sales of publications 
• Revenue from commercial establishments belonging to/affiliated with the 
organization 
• Money collected through drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and human  
trafficking [11]. 
b. ISIS 
Another terrorist organization called the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria-Sham 
(ISIS), or Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), recently started conducting terrorist 
activities along the Turkish-Iraqi and Turkish-Syrian borders. ISIS was preceded by 
another terrorist group known as the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), which was formed in 
2006. ISI was comprised of different rebel groups, most significantly Al-Qaeda. The 
terrorist organization known as ISIS was established in April 2013 and became one of the 
main terrorist organizations battling against conventional government forces in Iraq and 
Syria [12]. ISIS’s primary objective has been to establish an Islamic state ruled by 
shariah law [13]. The United States and many of its allies have been fighting ISIS for a 
couple of years, but in February 2015, President Obama formally asked Congress for 
approval of military force against ISIS [14]. In the last three years, ISIS has evolved from 
a classic terrorist organization into a complicated, well organized group [12]. In a short 
period of time, ISIS has replaced the PKK as the most deadly terrorist group in Turkey. 
Over the last couple of years, ISIS has been responsible for a quarter of all the deaths 
from terrorist attacks in Turkey [7]. As ISIS continuously increases its power, it becomes 
a more significant threat to Turkey’s borders. 
The known primary funding sources of ISIS are as follows: 
• Extortion 
• Collection of taxes and fees in areas under its control 
• Selling oil from fields it controls 
• Looting the homes of people who flee under threat of the militants [13]. 
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c. Al-Qaeda 
The main objective of Al-Qaeda is to take down the current governments in 
Muslim countries and establish a new Islamic regime. Al-Qaeda calls existing Muslim 
countries “puppets of the West” [16]. Al-Qaeda has been active in many countries as well 
as along Turkey’s southeastern border. Al-Qaeda usually appears with its suicide attacks 
and bombings. The main sources of money for this terrorist group are donations and fees 
gathered from its sympathizers [15]. 
3. Major Terrorist Incidents in the Region 
Officially, there have been, more than 35,000 Turkish people recorded as killed 
by terrorists since the 1980s [3]. Some of the terrorist attacks have occurred in big cities, 
but most of them have been carried out in rural areas, especially in southeastern Turkey. 
There are hundreds of terrorist attacks committed by PKK, ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and others 
terrorist organizations in Turkey. Below are listed some of the most violent terrorist 
incidents, defined as incidents in which more than 20 people died.   
June 20, 1987: Massacre launched in Pinarcik village of Omerli district in 
Mardin. Sixteen children, six women, eight men; in total 30 people were 
killed by the PKK [16]. 
November 26, 1989: In Iki Yaka village of Yuksekova district in 
Diyarbakir, 21 people were killed, and nine citizens were kidnapped by 
the PKK [16]. 
June 11, 1990: The PKK raided Cevrimli Village of Sirnak and killed 27 
people. A conflict occurred between PKK terrorists and the village guards, 
and in the end four guards lost their lives [16]. 
October 1, 1992: PKK terrorists raided Cevizdali village of Bitlis and 
killed 30 people. There were women and children among them, and 25 
were wounded. Terrorists set the village on fire and kidnapped 13 village 
guards [16]. 
July 6, 1993: The PKK made an armed raid on Basbaglar village of 
Kemaliye district in Erzincan and killed 28 people, among whom there 
were women, and wounded three people. After setting 57 houses on fire, 
the terrorists fled away [16]. 
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July 19, 1993: The PKK attacked Vanizer village of Bahcesaray district in 
the city of Van and killed 26 people, 22 of them were women [16]. 
August 4, 1993: PKK terrorists stopped two minibuses traveling between 
Kavakbasi and Yenidogan villages of Mutki district in Bitlis and shot 28 
people. In this attack 15 people were killed and 13 people were wounded 
[16]. 
October 5, 1993: A series of attacks by the PKK in several arable fields 
and villages of Batman, Siirt, and Hakkari caused the deaths of 35 people 
(most of them women and children). Also, 10 people were on the victims 
list as wounded, and 22 houses were sabotaged [16]. 
October 25, 1993: PKK terrorists raided Erzurum’s Cat district in Yavi 
region and took citizens from their homes and gathered them together in a 
coffee shop. They propagandized their declarations, and then killed them 
with automatic weapons. During the attack, 35 people died, and nearly 50 
were wounded. The terrorists then set the houses on fire and escaped [16]. 
November 15, 2003: Thirty people were killed and 146 wounded when 
car bombs shattered two synagogues in Istanbul. Authorities identified two 
men from southeast Turkey as the suicide bombers, saying the attacks bore 
the hallmarks of the al Qaeda network [17]. 
May 11, 2013: Reyhanli, a Turkish town on the border with Syria, was 
attacked by Al-Qaeda with twin car bombs, leaving behind an official toll 
of 52 deaths and 146 injuries [18]. 
B. CURRENT COUNTERTERRORISM METHODS AND PROBLEMS 
1. Methods 
This thesis focuses on the methods that the Turkish Air Force uses to detect and 
eliminate terrorists. It does not look at other methods applied by Turkish Army assets or 
police forces. Only the Turkish-Iraqi border is taken into consideration (rather than the 
whole southeastern border of Turkey). The Turkish Air Force has used the methods 
described below to kill terrorists or prevent them from attacking military stations, 
government agencies, and military and police lodgings along the Turkish-Iraqi border. 
The Turkish Armed Forces have a couple of resources that provide intelligence to 
the Turkish Air Force in southeastern Turkey. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) provide 
the most valuable information. UAVs facilitate intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance (ISR) missions over the border and provide information about terrorist 
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activities and locations. Besides UAVs, intelligence may be provided by another source, 
such as Special Operations Forces (SOF), other military patrols, or police forces. 
Sometimes, villagers provide significant information about terrorist activities in the 
region as well.   
After obtaining information and assessing it carefully, the Air Force immediately 
sends manned aircraft to the region to conduct attack missions. Commonly used Air 
Force bases are Diyarbakir Air Force Base (AFB), located in Diyarbakir city, and Erhac 
Air Force Base, located in Malatya city. In this thesis, we assume that only F-16s, 
deployed in Diyarbakir AFB are available for this kind of operation. After F-16s take off, 
they deploy to the area and, if they acquire a target, drop their air to ground weapons on 
terrorist militants. F-16s can locate and attack terrorists by using their onboard sensors or 
by using a UAV’s sensors. However, the preferred method is to locate the terrorist group 
with onboard sensors based on coordinates provided by UAVs and then drop a bomb and 
support it with onboard sensors. After releasing their bombs, F-16s may continue flying 
over the area for battle damage assessment or leave the area and return to base and rely 
on UAVs to make the assessment. 
2. Problems 
The Turkish Air Force has been encountering many problems with the current 
counterterrorism methods in southeastern Turkey. Diyarbakir AFB is the closest Air 
Force base to the Turkish-Iraqi border that accommodates strike aircraft. The distance 
between Diyarbakir AFB and the most western part of the Turkish-Iraqi border is 
approximately 115 nautical miles away, which takes at least 25 minutes to travel for an F-
16. The distance between Diyarbakir AFB and the most eastern part of the Turkish-Iraqi 
border is approximately 220 nautical miles away, which takes at least 45 minutes to 
travel for an F-16. We also need to add 5 to 15 minutes to the travel time for scramble 
response delays. Due to this inevitable delay, sometimes aircraft cannot reach the area in 
time, and as a result, they cannot prevent terrorists from attacking military facilities along 
the border. 
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Terrorist groups, such as the PKK, ISIS, and Al-Qaeda, which operate at the 
Turkish-Iraqi border, have supporters in urban areas. Sometimes, terrorist supporters who 
live in the cities where air force bases are located inform terrorists about aircraft activities 
at the air force base. As a result, terrorists sometimes know that aircraft are coming with 
fully loaded air-to-ground weapons and hide inside caves or deep valleys before the 
fighter aircraft reach the area. UAVs can also lose contact with terrorists and strike 
aircraft may find it difficult to locate and drop their air-to-ground weapons. 
Another problem the Turkish Air Force struggles with is bad weather conditions. 
The weather at the border area may be clear, but if weather conditions are bad in the city 
where the AFB is located, the strike package cannot take off and deploy to the area. 
The challenging terrain of the border is another problem for strike aircraft. The 
topography of the Turkish-Iraqi border is rough, which provides terrorists a strong 
advantage. Also, terrorists are well adapted to the area because they have been operating 
in the region for decades. Deep valleys and caves inside the mountains are perfect places 
for terrorists to hide and be protected. Therefore, it is difficult for strike aircraft to 
conduct attack missions in such terrain. Figure 2 and Figure 3 give examples of the rough 
terrain and terrorist caves near the Turkish-Iraqi border. 
Another significant problem is that manned aircraft have a limited fuel capacity 
relative to unmanned aircraft. The operational range of an F-16 with standard air-to-
ground weapons loaded is 1,740 nautical miles, which means it cannot fly over the area 
too long without air-to-air refueling [19]. Air-to-air refueling also requires significant 
time, depending on the location of tanker aircraft. F-16s may need to return to base 
without dropping their weapons if they cannot find an opportunity to attack terrorists 
within a limited time interval. 
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Figure 2.  An example of mountains near the Turkish-Iraqi border. Turkish 
military forces are conducting an operation against the PKK. Image 
from etkihaber.com. 
 
Figure 3.  Turkish military forces found terrorist caves in Turkish-Iraqi border. 
Image from aktifhaber.com. 
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C. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
The majority of the problems that Turkey has to overcome are related to limited 
time and challenging terrain. Using unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) in 
southeastern Turkey may help solve some of the problems. UCAVs are weaponized 
UAVs that can be used for air-to-ground attack missions against active terrorists. More 
detailed information about UAVs and UCAVs is given in Chapter II. 
This thesis analyzes the use of UCAVs in conjunction with manned aircraft 
against active terrorists in rough terrain. Replacing manned aircraft and/or F-16s with 
UCAVs may help secure the Turkish-Iraqi border more effectively. Because UCAVs can 
fly for more than 24 hours, they can apply unlimited pressure on terrorist groups and 
attack them right after detecting and classifying them. Using UCAVs in some regions of 
the border and F-16s in other regions might also increase effectiveness. For this purpose, 
we modeled the entire Turkish-Iraqi border in Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata 
(MANA), an agent-based, time-stepped, stochastic mission-level model. More detailed 
information about MANA appears in Chapter II. We examine the influence of UCAVs 
against active terrorists by looking at the number of terrorists killed, the time required to 
kill terrorists, and the probability that the terrorists reach their objective. We also vary the 
parameters of F-16s, UAVs, and UCAVs, such as sensor detection ranges, hit 
probabilities, speed, and reaction times to explore the most effective parameters for 
mission success. 
Turkey began developing its own unmanned aerial vehicle, called ANKA, in the 
2000s to reduce its reliance on foreign industry. ANKA is being developed by Turkish 
Aerospace Industries (TAI). It will be delivered to the Turkish military forces during the 
period 2016 to 2018 [20]. It is in the advanced medium-altitude long-endurance (MALE) 
class of unmanned aerial systems. ANKA can perform day and night and in all weather 
conditions for more than 24 hours continuously [21]. It will have both armed and 
unarmed versions. Figure 4 depicts unarmed versions of ANKA, which will be used for 
ISR missions. In our MANA model, we use ANKA’s performance characteristics to 
simulate those of the UCAVs. 
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Figure 4.  ANKA during a test flight. Image from tai.com.tr. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research is guided by the following questions: 
1. How might UCAVs enhance Turkey’s ability to secure its border 
characterized by rough geographical conditions? 
2. What combination of UCAVs and UAVs provides the same or better 
effectiveness as the combination of manned aircraft and UAVs currently 
in use? 
3. Is there a combination of manned aircraft, UCAVs, and UAVs that 
provides the same or better effectiveness than the manned aircraft and 
UAVs in use? 
4. What are the advantages and disadvantages of using UCAVs and UAVs 
only, manned aircrafts and UAVs only, or UCAVs, manned aircraft, and 
UAVs? 
E. THESIS FLOW 
Chapter II contains the background and provides useful information about 
vehicles, tools, techniques, and concepts. We provide definitions and benefits of UAVs 
and UCAVs, discuss agent-based simulation and modeling, and provide information 
about the Map-Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) software to prepare the reader 
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for the following chapters. Chapter III covers the development of the model and different 
scenarios that are used in this thesis. A detailed description of the agents in the model is 
explained in this chapter as well. Chapter IV explains design of experiment techniques 
and simulation runs. First, it describes the factors and levels that we vary in this thesis. 
Then, it explains the nearly orthogonal Latin hypercube (NOLH) design that was used to 
efficiently explore the experiment space. Last, it covers tools and techniques that we used 
to run our combat simulation. Chapter V concludes the thesis. It focuses on the analysis 
of the output. After describing the analysis tools used, it covers different analysis 
techniques and the results. Finally, it provides the findings and gives recommendations 
for further research. 
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II. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
“The future is in the skies.” 
– Mustafa Kemal Ataturk 
 
This chapter provides a review of the tools, systems, and concepts that we use in 
this thesis. First, we provide definitions and background about UAVs, with an emphasis 
on UCAVs. Second, we provide definitions and a discussion of the benefits of agent-
based modeling and simulation (ABMS). We also provide some information about Map 
Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA), which is the modeling tool used in this thesis. 
Last, we provide some examples of related studies on UAVs and UCAVs for border 
security and air-to-ground attack missions. 
A. UNMANNED VEHICLES 
1. Definitions of UAV/ UCAV and Background 
Before defining UAVs or UCAVs, we need to define an unmanned aircraft 
system (UAS). The DOD defines a UAS as “that system whose components include the 
necessary equipment, network, and personnel to control an unmanned aircraft” [22]. In 
other words, an unmanned aircraft system includes an unmanned aerial vehicle, human 
element (operator, technician), payload (sensors, weapons), and data link, among other 
components. Figure 5 shows the major components of a UAS [23]. A UAV is only one 
component of an unmanned aircraft system (UAS). According to the DOD UAS 
roadmap, a UAV is “a powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses 
aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely” 
[24]. In other words, a UAV is an aircraft without a pilot in it. 
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Figure 5.  Elements of an unmanned aircraft system (UAS). Image from [23]. 
UAVs were first introduced during WWI and were also used in Vietnam, but 
interest in them increased dramatically during the Balkan Peninsula conflict and 
Operation Desert Storm [25]. Interest in UAVs has continued to increase because of their 
great contribution to mission success during these conflicts. UAVs are critical 
components of ISR missions as stated in the DOD UAS roadmap. 
In today’s military, unmanned systems are highly desired by combatant 
commanders for their versatility and persistence. By performing tasks such 
as surveillance; signals intelligence (SIGINT); precision target 
designation; mine detection; and chemical, biological, radiological, 
nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance, unmanned systems have made key 
contributions to the Global War on Terror.  [26] 
UAVs can be separated into two distinct groups: remotely piloted UAVs and 
autonomous UAVs [27]. Remotely operated UAVs require someone to control the 
aircraft from a distance whereas autonomous UAVs do not require a human operator. The 
primary way of operating UAVs is still man-in-the-loop control rather than fully 
autonomous control. Militaries use UAVs in autonomous mode only for non-critical 
missions [28]. This is because of the fact that a human is still more reliable than a 
computer program for most of the decision-making process. 
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The primary application of UAVs has been in ISR, but in the last several years, 
governments and militaries have started to arm their UAVs. A weaponized version of a 
UAV, called the UCAV, can be used for air-to-ground or air-to-air attack missions. 
UCAVs, similar to manned aircraft, can be armed with a variety of weapons, such as 
missiles (AGM 114 Hellfire), laser-guided weapons (GBU-12 Paveway II), and GPS-
guided weapons (GBU-38 JDAM). They can be used to attack high-value, fixed-ground 
targets as well as moving ground and air targets in military operations. 
According to the U.S. DOD, UAV missions may include but are not limited to: 
• RSTA missions 
• Surveillance for search and rescue 
• Deception operations 
• Maritime operations such as naval surface fire support (NSFS), over-the-horizon 
targeting (OTH-T), ship classification, anti-ship missile defense (ASMD), 
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) 
• Electronic warfare (EW) and directed energy sensor reconnaissance 
• Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) reconnaissance 
• Special and psychological operations 
• Meteorology missions 
• Route and landing zone reconnaissance support 
• Adjustment of indirect fires and close air support (CAS) 
• Rear area security support 
• BDA 
• Radio and data relay [29] 
Many of the missions listed above can be achieved by manned aircraft as well, but 
some of the missions, such as nuclear, biological, and chemical reconnaissance, are too 
risky for a human. Therefore, UAVs are critical components for militaries. 
2. Benefits of Unmanned Aircraft 
Nowadays, governments and militaries are discussing what combination of 
piloted aircraft, UAVs, and UCAVs are best for ISR and attack missions. According to 
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the DOD UAS roadmap, “Unmanned systems have proven they can enhance situational 
awareness, reduce human workload, improve mission performance, and minimize overall 
risk to both civilian and military personnel, and all at a reduced cost” [30]. In other 
words, UAVs have become desirable components for military operations as well as 
civilian affairs because of their proven benefits. 
Moreover, military services can purchase and operate UAVs for less money than 
they pay for manned aircraft [31]. Including ground control stations, the procurement cost 
of a UAV is 40 to 80% of a manned aircraft cost and operation—in addition, the 
maintenance cost of a UAV is 20% of a manned aircraft cost [32]. According to the 
DOD, “transportation and logistics requirements to deploy the UAV systems are usually 
smaller than other airborne intelligence collection resources.” Also, “extensive special 
training is not required to use much of the information provided by UAVs.” [33] This is 
because UAVs are relatively smaller and less complex systems than manned aircraft. 
Among all benefits listed in the DOD’s UAS roadmap, the primary benefit of 
UAVs is their ability to decrease or prevent the loss of personnel life. Even when the 
environmental conditions do not allow using manned aircraft, UAVs can still provide 
effective military options. For example, it may be too risky to assign a manned aircraft to 
an NBC reconnaissance mission, but a UAV may still be an option for this mission. 
Because we do not need to worry about a pilot’s life, we can assign UAVs to the most 
dangerous missions. 
UAVs and UCAVs allow military forces to conduct surveillance and attack 
missions against highly defended targets. Because UAVs do not require a pilot in the 
cockpit, they can withstand extreme conditions that their piloted counterparts cannot, 
such as high acceleration forces (g) and long flight times. In general, removing the pilot 
from the aircraft provides the ability to design innovative concepts and to use them in all 
environmental conditions. 
B. AGENT-BASED MODELING SIMULATION 
Significant developments in computer technology and the high operating costs of 
real systems have given rise to the use of simulation programs in military services [34]. 
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There are a variety of military applications, such as training methods, attack/defense 
mission rehearsals, system effectiveness, new concepts of operations, and military tactics 
and techniques that can be explored or analyzed by modeling in a computer environment. 
Furthermore, due to the lower cost of computer simulation over real system use, military 
services can simulate large-scale military operations over and over again without 
spending more money. Simulation programs can also be used to bound complex 
problems, eliminate irrelevant options, and determine the areas where actual tools should 
be used or field experiments are needed. 
Agent-based modeling and simulation (ABMS) is one of the modeling and 
simulation techniques that allow users to represent real-world problems within a 
computer program. Sanchez and Lucas describe agent-based simulations as “models 
where multiple entities sense and stochastically respond to conditions in their local 
environments, mimicking complex large-scale system behavior” [35]. Agent-based 
modeling allows military agencies to simulate complicated and variable interactions of 
opposing military organizations in a battlespace. In agent-based modeling, autonomous 
agents such as aircraft, tanks, helicopters, ships, unmanned vehicles or humans, execute 
programmable stochastic behavioral and decision-making rules. As a result of individual 
agent behaviors and interactions between different agents an overall simulation result 
arises as a sophisticated global model. Castiglione lists ABMS’s properties as follows: 
1. Agents have internal states which can be represented by discrete or 
continuous variables. 
2. Agents may change their states after interacting with another agent or a 
state change may cause a change in behavior. 
3. Every agent may interact with another agent locally or globally. 
4. Rules, which range from simple logic to complex algorithms, drive agents’ 
behaviors. 
5. The system evolves over the time and both time and space can be discrete 
or continuous [36]. 
Agent-based modeling is a suitable and beneficial tool to be used in military 
applications. In his paper, Bonabeau states the benefits of ABMS techniques. 
 18 
1. ABMS captures emergent events which stem from interactions of 
individual entities. 
2. In many cases, ABMS is most inherent for explaining and simulating a 
system formed by ‘‘behavioral’’ entities. 
3. ABMS is flexible along multiple dimensions. It is easy to modify (add or 
delete agents) an agent-based model [37]. 
ABMS can be executed through many different programs, such as Microsoft 
Excel, Java, C++, MATLAB, and R. In this thesis, we use an ABMS platform called Map 
Aware Non-Uniform Automata (MANA) to explore the research questions. MANA is 
one of the most user friendly modeling tools, and for that reason, it has been widely used 
by NPS faculty and students [38]. 
C. MANA 
This section draws from the MANA user manual versions 4 and 5. For more 
detailed information about the descriptions and features of the modeling tool, the reader 
should look to the MANA manual. 
MANA is an agent-based, time-stepped, stochastic, mission-level simulation 
environment. It was developed by New Zealand’s Defense Technology Agency (DTA) 
and is used in a wide range of national and international scientific defense studies. The 
development of MANA has been ongoing since its first introduction in 2000. After DTA 
started to increase the sophistication of its agent-based models in the early 2000s, it has 
continually improved MANA by adding new features. DTA introduced the most recent 
version of MANA, MANA-V, in 2009. We use MANA-V as a modeling tool in this 
thesis. Different than early versions, MANA-V uses a vector-based approach for agent 
movement rather than a grid-based movement scheme. This feature of MANA-V 
provides a number of advantages, such as larger battlefields and greater flexibility for 
developing new model features. Moreover, MANA-V provides easier interpretation of 
scenarios because it uses international system (SI) units for ranges. Figure 6 illustrates the 
two different movement schemes used in previous versions and in MANA-V [39]. 
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Figure 6.  Two distinct movement schemes used in MANA:  (a) grid-based 
approach used in MANA 2, 3, and 4;  (b) vector-based approach used in 
MANA-V. Image from MANA manual. 
Primary elements of the MANA model are squads. In MANA, a squad is a 
collection of initially homogeneous agents and can be a single agent or a group of agents. 
Each squad can be defined as friend, enemy, or neutral. This affects the squad’s 
behaviors when interacting with other squads. Autonomous agents in MANA are 
• Map-Aware: Agents are aware of their environment through their organic sensing 
capability or through communication with other agents. 
• Non-uniform: Each major agent type has its own unique set of properties. 
• Automata: Agents react independently to various scenarios based on the 
information they have about their environment [39]. 
Each agent in MANA has personality characteristics that can drive it toward or 
away from other agents or objects in their environment. These personality settings can be 
changed depending on user-defined trigger states that switch the personality when (or if) 
certain events occur (e.g., an agent being shot at). A state is a collection of parameter 
values, such as personality weightings, sensor and weapon ranges, concealment 
percentages, and speed [39]. 
Movement of the agents is limited to the size of the battlefield. Direction and 
speed of the movement is determined by vector-based algorithms that consist of 
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personality weightings and penalty calculations defined by the user. Terrain, elevation, 
and background maps can be loaded into the model. These maps are basically Windows 
bitmaps that the user can modify using the built in MANA map editor or using some 
software such as Microsoft Paint or Adobe Photoshop. The terrain map affects agents’ 
“Going,” “Cover,” and “Concealment.”  “Going” refers to how the terrain affects an 
agent’s speed.  “Cover” defines the level of protection of an agent against enemy attacks.  
“Concealment” refers to the level of invisibility of an agent in the terrain.  “Going,” 
“Cover,” and “Concealment” parameters are determined by the colors which form the 
whole terrain map. The elevation map is gray-scale map ranging from black to white, and 
it is used for line-of-sight (LOS) calculations. The elevation map provides a realistic 
implementation of the battlefield. For example, an agent on one side of a hill cannot see 
or shoot at an agent on the other side of the hill. The background map does not affect 
agents. It can be stored to enhance a scenario’s appearance to the user [39]. 
An agent can detect and classify another agent within a range defined by the 
developer by using its own sensor (or sensors). The simple mode of the sensor operates as 
cookie-cutter sensor while in the advanced mode a user can define different sensor 
characteristics for different ranges. For example, it is more likely to detect nearby agents 
than farther agents. No matter if the simple mode or the advanced mode is used, detection 
requires a LOS between two agents. Similar to sensors, an agent can have weapons in the 
form of a kinetic energy weapon and/or a high explosive weapon. Agents can use those 
weapons against enemy agents. MANA uses a user-defined range probability table to 
determine the degree of effect of a weapon [39]. 
In MANA, agents can communicate with other agents in the same squad or with 
agents in different squads. Communication ranges, latency, reliability, and capacity of the 
transmission, and the type of information that is intended to be passed, is determined by 
the user. Communications between squads can be visualized in a situational awareness 
(SA) map. There are two types of SA maps, squad SA maps and inorganic squad SA 
maps. Any enemy detection made by one agent in the squad is put onto the squad’s SA 
map so that other agents in the same squad can access the information. Similar to the 
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squad SA map, the inorganic squad SA map shows detections made by an agent from a 
different squad that been communicated to the squad [39]. 
In terms of agent-based models, MANA has a number of advantages. Those 
advantages are listed in the MANA manual as follows. 
• It is user friendly and has an easily navigable user interface. Scenarios can be 
quickly edited “on the fly” during development, allowing different ideas to be 
quickly explored. In this regard, MANA can be thought of as a “sketch pad” for 
trying new military tactics. 
• MANA is supplied as a pre-compiled executable, so it runs relatively fast 
compared with other agent-based models built on interpreted languages. 
• The model has a built-in data farming capability which allows rapid exploration of 
parameter spaces. 
• MANA can model communications links between agents for information sharing. 
Hence, aspects of network-centric warfare (NCW) can be studied. 
• To model terrain features, MANA uses colored bitmaps. This has the advantage 
that terrain features can be quickly altered using a simple image editor (for 
example, MS Paint), while a scenario is in development. 
• MANA has a large number of trigger states that agents can go into based upon 
various events occurring on the battlefield. This increases the richness of behaviors 
and insights that can be obtained from scenarios [39]. 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
UAVs and UCAVs have been improving every day, and they are now regarded as 
a main element of modern warfare. Because of their undebatable contribution to battles, 
especially in asymmetric warfare environments, new and improved versions of UAVs 
and UCAVs are being produced by many different countries [40]. A significant number 
of studies that address UCAVs and border security issues depict the importance of the 
matter. We reviewed some of these studies below. 
In his thesis, Bessemer [41] points out the United States Air Force’s demand for 
UCAVs and seeks a quick fix to satisfy this demand until fully capable unmanned 
vehicles are produced [41]. He argues that the most effective way to decrease risk-of-life 
and budget costs is to introduce an F-16 unmanned aerial system (UAS) aircraft for 
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combat. He illustrates “how an effective F-16 UAS can synchronize recourses to properly 
complete UCAV development while instantly reducing risk of life” [41]. His overall 
assessment is that the F-16 UAS is a good solution for American air supremacy. 
In his study, Kumar [42] expresses that major improvements in UAVs have been 
in the role of tactical reconnaissance [42]. He demonstrates that UAVs are perfect tools to 
fill the information gap on the battlefield. If militaries employ UAVs in an efficient 
manner, the inherent characteristics of UAVs make them capable of complementing 
manned aircraft in the role of tactical reconnaissance [42]. Although militaries started to 
use UAVs instead of manned aircraft for some missions, they always seek more efficient 
designs and employment methods for UAVs, as Kumar pointed out. 
In his thesis, Beales [43] reviews the U.S. government’s decision to end F-22 
production and switch to UCAV procurement. He states that it is very obvious that 
UCAVs are cheaper and more persistent, but on the other hand, terminating F-22 
production decreases the USAF’s ability to defend the homeland against some potential 
threats [43]. As a result, he suggests a concentration toward UCAVs in future 
procurement while improving versatility and availability.   
In his thesis, Gill [44] constructs a simulation model of a strike scenario that 
focuses on the coordination of the Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (NUCAS), F/A 
18 Super Hornet, and the F-35C Lightning II. By using design of experiment techniques 
and making 12,000 simulation runs, he evaluates the results in order to determine the 
number of aircraft needed for mission success and the factors that are required to reduce 
friendly aircraft losses [44]. He determines that a four NUCAS division is advantageous 
and a stealth requirement is crucial in future aircraft development. 
In his thesis, Sulewski points out that “the future force will rely heavily on UAVs 
to provide eyes on the battlefield” [45]. He analyzes the effect of the numbers and 
capabilities of armed and unarmed UAVs in the U.S. Army’s future combat battalions. 
For this purpose, Sulewski builds a simulation model in MANA and makes 46,440 
computational experiments. He finds that UAVs significantly enhance the performance 
and armed UAVs (UCAVs) are critical in the opening phase of the battle. 
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In his study, Hume examines “the issue of weaponized UAV integration into the 
battlespace from the standpoint of doctrine, operational concept, and roles and missions” 
[46]. Hume makes some recommendations about how best to employ weaponized UAVs 
in the future. He recommends giving weaponized UAV missions to the U.S. Air Force, to 
create a joint acquisition strategy, to establish joint standards for unmanned aircraft (UA) 
employment, and to improve command and control systems of weaponized UAs. 
In her thesis, Ozcan analyzes the effectiveness of the UAVs in helping secure the 
Turkish-Iraqi border characterized by rough terrain and active terrorists [47]. She 
modeled the Turkish-Iraqi border in MANA and examined the potential impact of UAVs 
on detecting and classifying terrorists trying to pass the border and attack the blue forces. 
The results from the 103,200 runs showed that UAVs are very efficient in the detection 
and the classification of terrorists in this region. She also points out that the most 
significant factors of UAVs are the detection and the classification performance. 
All of the studies and theses that we summarized discuss different perspectives on 
the use of UCAVs. Some of them, such as [46], point out the strategic importance of 
UCAVs, whereas others, such as [45] and [42], discuss tactical level contributions. 
Moreover, some researchers, such as [44], examined the results of using UCAVs and 
manned aircraft together in a battlefield, while others, such as [43], discuss using only 
UCAVs alone. Building on the literature, this thesis examines the importance of using 
UCAVs in conjunction with manned aircraft in areas of rough terrain.  
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III. MODEL AND SCENARIO DESCRIPTION 
In this chapter, we explain the model development process and describe the 
scenarios we constructed to examine UCAV effectiveness. First, we discuss how we 
designed the battlefield and constructed the maps we needed for the model. Next, we 
describe our baseline scenario and seven alternative scenarios in detail. Finally, we 
explain the agents in the model. 
A. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
Map Aware Non-Uniform Automata Vector (MANA-V) was used as a modeling 
tool in this thesis. It took approximately two months to complete the model and make it 
ready to run. This two-month period included learning MANA, by reading the manual, 
and reviewing old models; constructing maps, elevation, background, and terrain maps; 
building the basic scenario; and finally, building alternative scenarios. 
1. Battlefield 
For this thesis, the 384 km Turkish-Iraqi border was modeled as a battlefield in 
MANA.  384 km is the real length of the Turkish-Iraqi border; as far as air distance is 
concerned, it is approximately 222 km. This served as the length of the battlefield.  108 
km was chosen as the width of the battlefield to include blue battalions on the north of 
the border and to adjust the map ratio. Therefore, a 222 km × 108 km terrain was 
considered the area of interest. The battlefield was bounded by the Turkish-Iranian border 
on the east and the Turkish-Syrian border on the west. We separated the battlefield into 
three independent operational regions. Each agent operates in a dedicated region and does 
not involve any activity in other regions. We display those regions on the map in the 
scenario description section later in this chapter. 
2. Map Construction 
As explained in Chapter II, MANA needs elevation and terrain map input if the 
user wants topography to affect the agents. Also, MANA accommodates a background 
map to improve visualization of the scenario. In this thesis, all three types of maps were 
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used because together they constructed a realistic mission-level model, which included 
humans moving on the ground, stationary ground assets, and aerial vehicles.   
a. Elevation and Background Maps 
The elevation map in gray-scale helps formulate line-of-sight (LOS) calculations. 
After selecting the area of interest, an elevation map was constructed using a variety of 
sources and software. Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI), the international 
developer of the geographic information system (GIS), was used to obtain raw elevation 
data for the Turkish-Iraqi border. We used ArcGIS software online to create, display, and 
analyze geospatial data developed by ESRI. Elevation data was stored as a keyhole 
markup language zipped (kmz) extension file that could be used by Google Earth. After 
opening the downloaded data in Google Earth, we saved a picture of the area of interest 
in a picture format. Finally, Microsoft Paint helped us adjust the size and resolution, and 
store the final version in bitmap (bmp) format, which is an acceptable format for MANA 
(see Figure 7). In this study, real world elevation was defined between 650 and 3200 
meters above sea level for the lowest and highest points, respectively. We also used the 
elevation map as a background map in the model by adding the Turkish-Iraqi border on 
the elevation map as a line. The background map does not affect agents. It simply 
enhances a scenario’s appearance to the user. 
 
Figure 7.  Elevation map used in the model. 
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b. Terrain Map 
The gray-scale elevation map was referenced to construct an accurate terrain map. 
The lightest parts of the elevation map are the tops of the mountains while the darkest 
parts are valleys. We used Microsoft Visual Studio to construct the terrain map. This 
process took more than a week because Visual Studio separates the elevation map into its 
pixels and the user needs to cross-reference the colors of every pixel with the elevation 
map. Using more improved software, such as Photoshop, is highly recommended for 
terrain map construction in order to save days or even weeks. 
The terrain map comprises three different colors, which represent three different 
terrain characteristics for mountains, off-road, and valleys. Each color on the terrain map, 
or in other words each terrain type, has a certain “Going,” “Cover,” and “Concealment” 
value ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. A value of 0.0 means “No” “Going,” “Cover” or 
“Concealment,” while a value of 1.0 means “Full” “Going,” “Cover” or “Concealment.”  
Terrain types and parameters are depicted in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.  Terrain types and parameters. 
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3. Model Time Step 
MANA is a time-stepped model, (i.e., all events occur in discrete intervals). In 
time-stepped models, each time the main script is executed, the simulation time is 
incremented by the simulation time step. In other words, the computer makes all the 
required calculations for every time step, and the next calculation occurs in the next time 
step. Using large time steps results in fast but inaccurate simulations because the user 
may miss some important events. On the other hand, small time steps lead to more 
precise simulations, but will take more time. If the model is too complex, the run time 
will be even more because the computer will have to make more calculations every time 
step. In our model, the time step was set to one second to catch most every detail during 
simulation runs. The time step of the model was set to one second, which meant that each 
time step corresponded to one second in real time. 
B. SCENARIOS 
We built our scenarios by taking historical incidents as a reference. Terrorist 
groups have conducted bloody attacks against Turkish military assets, police forces, and 
civilians along the Turkish-Iraqi border in the past causing many deaths. We gave some 
examples of these attacks in Chapter I. Sometimes terrorist groups attacked with only a 
couple of terrorists and sometimes made simultaneous coordinated attacks in different 
locations with many different groups. One of these examples occurred on September 11, 
2011 in Semdinli province of southeastern Turkey. A total of 130 PKK terrorists attacked 
Semdinli’s District Police Headquarters, District Gendarmerie command, 3rd Tactical 
Mountaineer Gendarmerie Brigade, and police checkpoint simultaneously with machine 
guns and rocket launchers [48]. Three people were killed, and seven were injured in this 
attack. Turkish military and police forces immediately responded to the attacks; seven 
terrorists were killed, and the rest ran away towards northern Iraq. 
Our scenario is based on this incident. By experiencing this horrible terrorist 
attack, we were reminded that preventing terrorist groups from crossing the border is 
crucial. Otherwise, a skirmish between our soldiers and terrorists and resulting deaths are 
inevitable. We are trying to figure out how effective UCAVs might be in that area as an 
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alternative to F-16s. For this purpose, we constructed eight different air-to-ground attack 
plans comprising different combinations of F-16s, UAVs, and UCAVs. We call them 
different scenarios throughout the thesis since each of them needs to be run separately in 
MANA, one baseline and seven alternative scenarios. 
1. Baseline Scenario 
The baseline scenario was constructed based on the skirmish explained above. 
This scenario represents current counterterrorism methods of the Turkish Air Force. Our 
baseline scenario includes three F-16s as strike assets, three UAVs for ISR missions, and 
three terrorist groups that attempt to cross the border and make their way to attack three 
blue battalions. The baseline scenario also has partisans, who are the supporters of 
terrorists in the cities, and a dummy agent, who is used to terminate the runs after a 
terrorist reaches their objective. As mentioned previously, the battle area is separated into 
three regions and each F-16, UAV, and terrorist group are assigned to a specific region. 
Figure 9 depicts the general overlay of the baseline scenario and its three regions. In this 
scenario, if a UAV detects and classifies any terrorist activity along the border, it 
immediately reports it to the F-16 that is responsible for that specific region. Each UAV 




Figure 9.  Baseline scenario. 
2. Alternative Scenario 1 
In this alternative scenario (see Figure 10), we replace all F-16s with UCAVs. 
UAVs still conduct ISR missions in their regions. Similar to baseline scenario, in 
alternative scenario 1, each UCAV is responsible for one specific region. The biggest 
difference between the baseline scenario and alternative scenario 1 is that in alternative 
scenario 1 we double our detection sensors with the addition of UCAVs. UCAVs also 
search for terrorist activities along the border in conjunction with UAVs, and if they find 
a terrorist group, they can quickly conduct an attack mission against them.  
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Figure 10.  Alternative scenario 1. 
3. Alternative Scenarios 2, 3, and 4 
In alternative scenarios 2, 3, and 4, we use one F-16 and two UCAVs as air-to-
ground strike assets. We assign those assets to different regions in each scenario. In 
alternative scenario 2, the F-16 is responsible for region 1 and UCAVs are responsible for 
regions 2 and 3. In alternative scenarios 3 and 4, the F-16 is assigned to regions 2 and 3, 
respectively. We keep UAVs active in these scenarios, like we do in our other alternative 
scenarios. Therefore, two of the three regions have two detection sensors (the sensors on 
the UAVs and UCAVs) while one of the regions has only one sensor, the UAV’s sensor. 
As a result, we expect the reaction time to be smaller in the single-sensor regions than the 
reaction time in the double-sensor region. Figure 11 shows alternative scenario 3 as an 
example of one of the F-16 and two UCAVs scenarios. 
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Figure 11.  Alternative scenario 3. 
4. Alternative Scenarios 5, 6, and 7 
In alternative scenarios 5, 6, and 7, we use two F-16s and one UCAV as air-to-
ground strike assets. We assign those assets to different regions in each scenario. In 
alternative scenario 5, F-16s are responsible for regions 1 and 2, whereas a UCAV is 
responsible for region 3. In alternative scenarios 6 and 7, the lone UCAV is assigned to 
regions 2 and 1, respectively. We keep UAVs active in these scenarios just as we did for 
the other alternative scenarios. Therefore, one of the regions among three have two 
detection sensors (UAVs and UCAVs) while the other two regions have only one sensor, 
the UAV’s sensor. As a result, we expect the reaction time to be larger in single-sensor 
regions than the reaction time in double-sensor region. Figure 12 shows alternative 
scenario 7 as an example of a two F-16s and one UCAV scenario. 
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Figure 12.  Alternative scenario 7. 
C. MANA USER INTERFACE 
After defining the battlefield, constructing necessary maps, and building the basic 
scenario, the user can edit agent properties using MANA’s graphical user interface 
(GUI). The “edit squad properties” tab under the “setup” menu provides access to squad 
properties. The user can change various properties of a squad by selecting tabs under the 
“edit squad properties” window. These tabs include general, map, personalities, tangibles, 
sensors, weapons, intra-squad SA, inter-squad SA, and advanced. The tabs in the “edit 
squad properties” window are shown in Figure 13. Before explaining these tabs, we 
explain the trigger states first. The MANA manual defines trigger states as follows. 
For a simple MANA scenario, personality weightings and other agent 
characteristics are first defined for each squad’s Default state. This may be 
all that is required for a simple scenario. Once a scenario starts running 
MANA has the flexibility to allow agents to trigger into other states apart 
from the Default state depending on different events occurring on the 
battlefield. This adds a new level of richness to the types of agent behavior 
which might emerge in a scenario. [39] 
The “general” tab is the place where general squad data is defined. The user can 
change a squad’s name, number of agents, and initial fuel capacity by using this tab. The 
user can also activate or deactivate a squad from here for a specific replication of the 
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simulation. The “general” tab also allows the user to save, delete, or load a squad. The 
“map” tab is the place where the user defines the home and waypoints of a squad. The 
information in both general and map tabs does not vary as a function of trigger states. 
The “personality” tab allows the user to define a set of personality weightings for 
a squad of agents using slider bars, as illustrated in Figure 13. The slider bars on the 
panel are for adjusting agent propensities. A positive value means an agent has a positive 
propensity towards the associated object while a negative value indicates a negative 
propensity. The higher the weighting value is, the greater the attraction. For example, in 
Figure 13 there is a positive movement weighting of 100 toward enemy agents. There are 
three sources from which the information originates. The information that agents collect 
directly using their own sensors corresponds to the “agent SA” section. The shared squad 
information corresponds to the “squad SA” section. Inorganic SA refers to the 
information that has been obtained from other squads via communications links. 
Different trigger states can have different settings. 
 
Figure 13.  Personality settings panel. 
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The “tangibles” tab allows the user to adjust an agent’s speed, icon type and color, 
allegiance, threat level, and class. The user can also define the number of shots required 
to kill an agent and armor thickness using the “tangibles” tab. For more detailed 
information, please refer to the MANA manual [39]. The “tangibles” tab in the “edit 
squad properties” window is shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.  Tangibles panel. 
The “sensors” panel, shown in Figure 15, allows the user to define up to six 
different sensors for an agent. The user can select any sensor, and change its name and 
use it in simple or advanced mode. The range tables allow the user to adjust the detection 
and classification ranges of a sensor. The user also defines an average time between 
detections and a classification probability for a sensor in this panel. The user can define a 
single range, time, and probability value or range tables to define the change in sensing 
capability as a function of the distance. The target classes section allows the user to 
specify target classes for this sensor. Sensor characteristics can vary depending on the 
agent’s trigger state. 
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Figure 15.  Sensors panel. 
The “weapons” tab consists of information about an agent’s weapons. Similar to 
sensors, the user can define up to six different weapons for each agent. Each weapon’s 
characteristics can be set up differently using this panel. The user can define a weapon’s 
class, model, and fire mode as well as the number of ammunition an agent has. Similar to 
the “sensors” panel, there is a range-probability table for each weapon to define the 
probability of hitting a target at a corresponding distance. In another table, the user 
specifies target and non-target classes. Weapon characteristics can vary depending on the 
agent’s trigger state. The user can also enable or disable a weapon from this panel. The 
“weapons” tab in the “edit squad properties” window is shown in Figure 16. For other 
sections that we did not explain here, please refer to the MANA manual [39]. 
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Figure 16.  Weapons panel. 
The “intra-squad” and the “inter-squad SA” tabs refer to how the information is 
shared within the squad and between the squads, respectively. By using the “intra-squad 
SA” tab, the user defines communication delays between the agents within a squad as 
well as the squad contact persistence. The “inter-squad” tab, depicted in Figure 17, allows 
the user to define a communication link between any two squads. The user can change 
the maximum communication range, latency, maximum capacity, and reliability of 
communication for each agent or squad using this panel. The allegiance, location, 
velocity, and movement direction of an agent can be transferred through these links. 
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Figure 17.  Inter-squad SA panel. 
Finally, the “advanced” tab provides the user more sophisticated information such 
as the random patrol tendency of an agent, formation type of a squad, and the search 
algorithm type of an agent. 
D. AGENT DESCRIPTIONS 
The primary element of the MANA model is the squad. A squad can be either a 
single agent or a group of agents. When we define each squad’s allegiance in MANA, it 
affects a squad’s behavior when it interacts with other squads. Table 1 displays the 17 
squads used in this model. 
Allegiance determines which side of the battle an agent will fight on. There are 
three options for an agent’s allegiance: enemy, friend, or neutral. Neutral can be used to 
represent civilians or noncombatants in a scenario. Agent threat levels and agent class are 
used to delineate between enemy types in a scenario. For example, the user can 
differentiate between heavy-armored vehicles or light infantry by defining heavy-
armored vehicles as threat-level three and light infantry as threat-level two.  
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Table 1.   Allegiance, threat level, and class of squads. 
Squad No Squad Name Allegiance Threat Level Class 
1 Blue_UAV1 1 3 1 
2 Blue_UAV2 1 3 1 
3 Blue_UAV3 1 3 1 
4 F-16_1 1 3 1 
5 F-16_2 1 3 1 
6 F-16_3 1 3 1 
7 UCAV1 1 3 1 
8 UCAV2 1 3 1 
9 UCAV3 1 3 1 
10 Blue_Bat_1 1 3 1 
11 Blue_Bat_2 1 3 1 
12 Blue_Bat_3 1 3 1 
13 Red_Team1 2 3 2 
14 Red_Team2 2 3 2 
15 Red_Team3 2 3 2 
16 Partisan 2 0 0 
17 Dummy Agent 2 3 99 
 
Figure 18 depicts the starting positions of the agents on the battlefield. The yellow 
line represents the Turkish-Iraqi border. Three terrorist groups are located south of the 
border while UAVs and UCAVs are located to the north. F-16s are waiting to be called at 
the top left corner, where the symbolic air force base is located. Terrorist partisans are 
located around the air force base, so they can provide the terrorists with information on 
aircraft activity. 
 
Figure 18.  Overview of the battlefield with all agents included. 
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1. Blue UAVs 
Blue UAVs are assigned to intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance missions 
in a designated region along the Turkish-Iraqi border. Simulated UAVs in this thesis are 
medium-altitude, long-endurance UAVs capable of flying over 24 hours. Blue UAVs 
follow predetermined waypoints after the simulation starts. They are basically 
programmed to fly back and forth along the border section to which they are assigned in a 
“default” state. Using their onboard sensors, the UAVs try to detect and classify terrorists 
if they exist. Once they detect any activity along the border, they focus on this location 
and try to classify the detected activity. If the UAVs confirm a terrorist presence, they go 
into an “enemy contact” state and report it to the weaponized units through 
communication links after a user input delay. This time-delay accounts for the time spent 
during conversation and the reaction time. This process is summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2.   State process of blue UAV squads in MANA. 









Run start Next waypoint Unknowns - 0 1 Default 
F-16 squads 
UCAV squads Default 
Next waypoint 
Unknowns - 90 knots - - 
Enemy contact 3 Enemy threat 3 Unknowns - 90 knots 5000 Default 
 
2. F-16s 
There are three F-16s located at the Air Force base. They are configured with air-
to-ground weapons as well as with sensors. F-16s do not act until they receive a scramble 
order as a result of a terrorist detection by a UAV. A scramble response time of 5 to 15 
minutes for F-16 squads accounts for the communication latency between them and the 
UAVs. After UAVs detect terrorist activity, F-16s go into an “inorganic SA enemy 
contact” state and fly directly to the region. Afterward, using their onboard sensors, they 
detect and classify the terrorist group, based on the UAV report, which means they are in 
an “enemy contact” state and conduct an air-to-ground attacks. 
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Each F-16 can carry two weapons. After launching the first bomb, they go into an 
“ammo out weapon 1” state in which a five-minute delay accounts for a repositioning 
time for the F-16s. F-16s have two sensors, one for terrorists and the other for dummy 
agents. They also have three weapons, two of which will be used against terrorists and 
one against dummy agents.   
Effective ranges of F-16 sensors and weapons in the simulation are greater than 
their real-world values. The reason for this is the following. Real-world terrorist 
formations are normally very small compared to the battlefield, and during an attack, they 
typically scatter in a 2 to 3 km area. But if we modeled our scenario this way, we would 
see an entire terrorist group as a dot on the battlefield. Therefore, we dispersed them 10 to 
15 km to see actions and make modifications to the model more easily. Finally, we 
increased detection, classification, and weapon ranges proportionally as well in order to 
get a realistic result. 
After dropping two bombs, F-16s go into the “ammo out weapon 2” state, return 
to a designated area where a dummy agent is located, and kill the dummy agent to halt 
the scenario run. The scenario terminates when the dummy agent takes three hits. If F-16s 
run out of fuel before they drop their second weapon, they suspend their missions for 25 
minutes, which corresponds with the time spent during air-to-air refueling. This process 
is summarized in Table 3. 
Table 3.   State process of F-16 squads in MANA. 









Run start Next waypoint - 0 knots 99999 Default 
UAV squads 
Default Enemy threat 3 - 300 knots - - 
Enemy contact 3 Enemy threat 3 - 300 knots 10000 Default 
Inorganic SA 
Enemy contact 3 Enemy threat 3 - 150 knots 99999 Spare 1 
Spare 1 Enemy threat 3 - 300 knots 99999 Default 
Ammo out 
weapon 1 Enemy threat 3 - 300 knots 300 Spare 1 
Fuel out Enemy threat 3 - 0 knots 1500 Spare 2 
Spare 2 Enemy threat 3 - 0 knots 1 Default 
Ammo out 
weapon 2 Next waypoint - 
2000 
knots 99999 Default 
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3. UCAVs 
There are three UCAVs assigned to a specific portion of the border. Similar to 
UAVs, UCAVs start searching for terrorists along the border in their “default” state. 
However, different than the UAVs, they can carry two air-to-ground weapons, like the F-
16s. When they detect and classify terrorists, they go into an “enemy contact” state. 
Thereafter, they drop their first weapons and go into the “ammo out weapon 1” state in 
which a five-minute delay accounts for a repositioning time for the UCAVs. After 
dropping their second bombs, they go into the “ammo out weapon 2” state and fly to a 
designated area where a dummy agent is located. UCAVs can also communicate with 
UAVs. If UAVs detect terrorist activity first, they report it to the UCAVs who then come 
and launch their air-to-ground weapons. 
Sensor and weapon settings of UCAV squads are similar to those of F-16s, but the 
ranges are shorter. UCAVs have two sensors, one for terrorists and the other for dummy 
agents. They also have three weapons, two of which are used against terrorists and one 
against dummy agents. Similar to F-16 squads, we re-scaled the sensor and weapon 
ranges of UCAV squads in order to get a realistic result. This process is summarized in 
Table 4. 
Table 4.   State process of UCAV squads in MANA. 









Run start Next waypoint Unknowns - 100 knots 1 Default 
UAV squads 
Default Next waypoint Unknowns - 100 knots - - 
Enemy contact 3 Enemy threat 3 Unknowns - 90 knots 5000 Default 
Inorganic SA 
Enemy contact 3 Enemy threat 3 - 100 knots 99999 Spare 1 
Spare 1 Enemy threat 3 - 90 knots 99999 Default 
Ammo out 
weapon 1 Enemy threat 3 - 90 knots 300 Spare 1 
Fuel out Enemy threat 3 - 0 knots 1500 Spare 2 
Ammo out 
weapon 2 Alt waypoint - 
2000 
knots 99999 Default 
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4. Blue Battalions 
Blue battalions in this model are symbolic agents, so they do not have any active 
mission. There are three blue battalion agents that provide visual information about the 
final waypoints of terrorists. Terrorists try to reach blue battalions and attack simulated 
military facilities. 
5. Red Teams 
There are three terrorist groups in the model. Each terrorist group consists of 40 
terrorists whose main objective is to cross the border, reach military facilities, and attack 
them. These groups are initially located south of the Turkish-Iraqi border and start to 
proceed to the north when the runs begin. We adjust personality settings of terrorist 
groups so that they stick together while they are proceeding. As we mentioned before, 
each trigger state can have different settings. In the “default” state, terrorists move 
towards their next waypoint with a 70% propensity while they conceal at a value of 40%. 
When any of the terrorists inside the group detects a blue agent, it goes into an “enemy 
contact” state and informs other agents in the group. As a result, all agents in this specific 
group go into a “squad enemy contact” state and implement this state’s personality 
settings. In an “enemy contact” or “squad enemy contact” state, terrorists increase their 
concealments to prevent blue agents from detecting them. In order to increase their 
concealment, terrorists tend to use the terrain types that provide more concealment, such 
as moving toward “green” regions on the terrain map, which represents deep valleys. 
Therefore, they start to separate from each other a little bit. 
Another trigger state that terrorists can get into is an “inorganic SA enemy 
contact” state. Terrorists go into this state after partisan agents detect aircraft activity and 
deliver this information to terrorists with some delay. Terrorists increase their 
concealment in an “inorganic SA enemy contact” state as well. A “squad shot at (sec)” 
state means that F-16s or UCAVs have dropped their second weapons on the terrorists. In 
this state terrorists turn back, and run away toward the mountains and hide inside the 
caves. 
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Terrorists can detect and classify enemy agents within a defined range. The 
elevation map affects detection and classification capabilities of terrorists. Terrorists have 
weapons that can fire within a certain range. They will use this weapon against imaginary 
blue soldiers inside the blue battalions. Because there are no blue soldiers in the model, 
the number of terrorists who have reached the blue battalions before the simulation ends 
is determined by the number of blue soldiers killed. This process is summarized in  
Table 5. 
Table 5.   State process of red team squads in MANA. 









Run start Next waypoint - 50 km/h 100 Default 
Partisan squad 




3 km/h - - 




- 2 km/h 1500 Default 
Inorganic SA 




- 2 km/h 3000 Default 
Squad 




- 2 km/h 1500 Default 
Squad shot at 
(sec) 
Alt waypoint 
Concealment - 5 km/h 99999 Default 
 
6. Partisans 
Partisans are the civil supporters of terrorist groups who live in the cities where 
the AFB is located. When they see aircraft activity inside the AFB, they inform terrorists 
about this, so terrorists can hide or take some precautions. Partisans communicate with 
terrorist groups through communication links which are set using the “inter-squad SA” 
tab in MANA. 
7. Dummy Agent 
Dummy agents are only used to terminate each run. Each strike asset, either an F-
16 or a UCAV depending on the scenario, carries a weapon that can be employed against 
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dummy agents. After finishing their missions, F-16s and UCAVs fly to the dummy 
agent’s coordinate and drop their special weapons. A dummy agent is killed after it takes 
three shots, thereby terminating the scenario (i.e., all three terrorist groups have been 
attacked and stopped).  
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IV. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Design-of-experiment (DOE) techniques allow the user to vary the input 
parameters in an efficient manner and to generate multiple variations of a model [49]. 
The user can explore the effects of the factors used in the model as well as the 
interactions between the factors by using DOE techniques. DOE is a critical part of the 
modeling and simulation analysis process. In this chapter, we explain the factors used to 
construct the experimental design of our study. Next, we explain the nearly orthogonal 
Latin hypercube (NOLH) design that is used in this thesis. Last, we mention the model 
running process. 
A. FACTORS OF INTEREST 
There are numerous factors that affect the outcome of a military operation in the 
real world. We can divide these factors into two groups: controllable and uncontrollable. 
Controllable factors, also known as decision variables, are those that the user can 
manipulate in the real world during the system development or the employment phase. 
For instance, aircraft speed, sensor detection range, or aircraft altitude are controllable 
factors. Uncontrollable factors are those that the user cannot manipulate in the real world. 
Enemy characteristics, such as number of terrorists and enemy weapon capabilities, or 
environmental characteristics, such as wind speed, can be considered uncontrollable 
factors. It is impossible to take into account every factor in a simulation environment. 
Therefore, we varied the 28 factors that we believe will influence the outcome the most. 
Among these 28 factors, 20 are controllable factors and eight are uncontrollable factors. 
1. Controllable Factors 
In this thesis, controllable factors include the parameters of F-16s, UCAVs, and 
UAVs. We varied the sensor, weapon, and time-related parameters of F-16s, UCAVs, 
and UAVs within some ranges to explore the effects on the outcome. The factor names 
are the same as those produced in the MANA output. Table 6 provides a general 
explanation of controllable factors and their ranges. The following sections explain the 
factors and the reasons of selecting minimum and maximum values associated to those 
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factors in detail. Because we use the same factors for F-16s, UCAVs, and UAVs, we 
explain the factor and the differences among the platforms for that factor in the same 
section. 
Table 6.   Controllable factors, brief explanations, minimum and maximum 
ranges, and units of the factors used in the model. 
 
 
a. Sensor Classification Range  
The sensor classification range (SnrClsRng) applies for F-16, UCAV, and UAV 
squads. Sensor classification range is the distance at which an F-16, UCAV, and UAV 
can classify other squads. 
For F-16s, this value varies from 4000 to 8000 meters. Classification range of an 
F-16 is greater than its real-world value because, in the real world, terrorists are normally 
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very small compared to the battlefield. During an attack, they normally scatter in a 2 to 3 
km area, but if we modeled our scenario this way, we would see one terrorist group as a 
dot on the battlefield. Therefore, we dispersed them 10 to 15 km to see actions and make 
modifications on the model. Finally, we increased the classification range proportionally 
in order to get a realistic result. The same rule applies for UCAV and UAV squads as 
well. 
For UCAVs, this value varies from 6000 to 8000 meters, which is greater than 
those for F-16s. This difference is because of two reasons. First, the UCAV that we use in 
our model will have more sophisticated sensors. Second, based on our experience and 
previous operations, it is more difficult for a pilot to classify terrorists while flying the jet 
than for a remote operator of a UCAV. Therefore, we give the advantage to the UCAV 
for classifying the terrorists. 
For UAVs, this value varies from 4000 to 8000 meters, which is the same of those 
for F-16s. This is because UAVs that we simulate in this thesis are old compared to the 
UCAVs. 
b. Sensor Detection to Classification Range Ratio  
The sensor detection to classification range ratio (SnrDetToClassRatio) applies 
for F-16, UCAV, and UAV squads. This ratio is the value obtained by dividing the sensor 
detection range by a factor to get the sensor classification range. 
The sensor detection range must be less than or equal to the sensor classification 
range because a sensor cannot classify a threat without first detecting it. Therefore, we 
vary the sensor detection to classification ratio from 1 to 2 for F-16s, UCAVs, and UAVs. 
We multiply this number with the classification range to determine the detection range 
that MANA will use for calculations. By utilizing this feature, we prevent MANA from 
producing a detection range that is smaller than a classification range. 
c. Classification Probability  
The sensor classification probability (ClsProb) applies for F-16, UCAV, and UAV 
squads. The sensor classification probability refers to how likely is it for an F-16, UCAV, 
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and UAV to classify a terrorist. For this research, we ignored false-positive classification 
probabilities, which is when an agent wrongly classifies another agent as a terrorist. The 
classification probability depends on several factors in the real world, such as sensor 
capabilities, pilot capabilities, weather, and terrain. 
Based on personal experiences and previous operations, we vary the classification 
probability of an F-16 from 0.6 to 0.9. This range seems higher than the real world 
values. The reason for that is the following. F-16 squads first interact with terrorist 
groups after UAVs detect and classify them. Therefore, F-16s deploy to the area with the 
location information of the terrorist groups and start searching for terrorists based on this 
information. As a result, it is more likely for an F-16 to classify a terrorist group than 
other units in the model. 
We vary the classification probability from 0.1 to 0.7 and from 0.07 to 0.5 for 
UCAVs and UAVs, respectively. The difference between the UCAV and the UAV 
classification probability is because UCAVs have more sophisticated sensors than UAVs 
in our model. 
d. Average Time Between Detection  
The average time between detection (TimeBetwDet) applies for F-16, UCAV, and 
UAV squads. The average time between detections factor corresponds to the detection 
capability of an F-16, UCAV, and UAV. Different than the classification probability, 
MANA does not provide an option to explicitly define detection probability to the user. 
In MANA, the per time-step detection probability is set given the average time between 
detection—as one gets with a geometric random variable.  
For F-16s, we vary the average time between detections from 100 to 800 seconds, 
whereas we use 400 to 1000 and 700 to 1300 seconds for UCAVs and UAVs, 
respectively. The average time between detections is smaller for F-16s than those for 
UCAVs and UAVs because F-16s start to search for the terrorists with a location 
knowledge provided by UAVs. However, UCAVs and UAVs do not have any 
preliminary knowledge about the location of the terrorists. The reason that a UACV’s 
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average time between detections is smaller than those of a UAV is UCAVs have more 
advanced onboard sensors in the model.  
e. Maximum Effective Weapon Range 
The maximum effective weapon range (WpnRng) applies for F-16 and UCAV 
squads. The weapon range is the maximum effective range at which an air-to-ground 
weapon of an F-16 and UCAV can kill a terrorist. MANA has two modes for weapon 
settings, simple and advanced. We used the advanced mode in which weapon 
effectiveness is determined by a probability-range table. We defined two ranges and 
probabilities corresponding to these ranges in a table, one for minimum and the other for 
maximum range. In our model, we only vary the maximum weapon range for the 
weapons that an F-16 and a UCAV can carry. MANA interpolates the ranges and the 
probabilities between the minimum and maximum values. 
Similar to the sensor ranges, weapon range is also greater than real world values 
because we increased it proportionally to the terrorist dispersion on the battlefield. We 
vary maximum effective weapon range of an F-16 from 4000 to 8000 meters. We reduce 
this range to 3000 to 5000 meters for UCAVs because the UCAVs that we simulate in the 
model carry smaller weapons than those of the F-16s. Based on personal experience and 
previous operations, we decided that these ranges are appropriate for our model’s scale. 
f. Weapon Hit Probability 
The weapon hit probability (HitProb) applies for F-16 and UCAV squads. The 
weapon hit probability is the probability that an air-to-ground weapon of an F-16 and 
UCAV hits the target. Similar to the weapon range factor, we only vary the weapon hit 
probability at the maximum weapon range and MANA interpolates the values between 
minimum and maximum. This probability depends on several factors, such as sensor 
capabilities, weather, target mobility, pilot capability, and terrain. 
We vary this value from 0.4 to 0.8 and from 0.5 to 0.8 for F-16s and UCAVs, 
respectively. We give UCAVs a small advantage because they have more advanced 
onboard sensors and more precise weapons than F-16s in the model. 
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g. Scramble Response Time 
The scramble response time (ScrTime) applies for F-16 and UCAV squads. The 
scramble response has different meanings in the model. For an F-16, it is the time in 
which an F-16 takes off after receiving a scramble order. In our model, we utilize this 
time by defining communication latency between the F-16 and the UAV. After a UAV 
classifies a terrorist group, it reports this group to the F-16 with some delay, which 
corresponds to the scramble response time of F-16. We vary this value from 420 to 900 
seconds for an F-16. 
For a UCAV, the scramble response time is the time in which a UAV can pass the 
information of terrorist locations to a UCAV. Different than the F-16s, UCAVs start 
searching for terrorists along the border like UAVs. If a UAV detects a terrorist activity 
first, it reports it to the UCAV. For this case, we use the scramble response time factor to 
represent a communication delay between the UAV and the UCAV through the 
communication latency in MANA. We vary this value from 100 to 600 seconds for a 
UCAV. It is smaller than those for the F-16 because this factor represents both the 
communication delay and the reaction time for an F-16 while it refers only to the 
communication delay for a UCAV. 
h. Speed 
The speed factor applies for UAV and UCAV squads. The speed is the velocity of 
a UAV and a UCAV during the search. We vary this value from 90 to 200 knots for a 
UCAV, while we vary it from 80 to 110 knots for a UAV. Again, the increased speed is 
because UCAVs are newer systems than UAVs. 
2. Uncontrollable Factors 
Uncontrollable factors include the parameters of terrorists and partisans. We 
varied sensor and time-related parameters of terrorists and partisans within some ranges 
to explore the effects on the outcome. The factor names are the same as those produced in 
MANA output. Table 7 provides a general explanation of the uncontrollable factors and 
their ranges. The following sections explain the factors and the reasons of selecting the 
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minimum and maximum values associated to those factors in detail. Similar to previous 
section, we explain the factor and the differences among the platforms for that factor in 
the same section. 
Table 7.   Uncontrollable factors, brief explanations, minimum and 
maximum ranges, and units of the factors used in the model. 
 
a. Sensor Classification Range 
The sensor classification range (SnrClsRng) applies for terrorist and partisan 
squads. Sensor classification range is the distance at which a terrorist and a partisan can 
classify other squads. 
This value varies from 700 to 1300 meters for a terrorist while it varies from 1500 
to 2500 meters for a partisan. We define this value larger for partisans because partisans 
live in the cities and terrorists are traveling on a rough terrain, which decreases the line-
of-sight of a terrorist. 
b. Sensor Detection to Classification Range Ratio 
The sensor detection to classification range ratio (SnrDetToClassRatio) applies 
for terrorist and partisan squads. This ratio is the value obtained by dividing the sensor 
detection range by a factor to get the sensor classification range. 
The sensor detection range must be less than or equal to the sensor classification 
range because a sensor cannot classify a threat without detecting it. Therefore, we vary 
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the sensor detection to classification ratio from 1 to 2 for terrorists and partisans. We 
multiply this number with the classification range to determine the detection range that 
MANA uses for calculations. By utilizing this feature, we prevent MANA from 
producing a detection range that is smaller than a classification range. 
c. Sensor Classification Probability 
The sensor classification probability (TerroristClsProb) applies for terrorist 
squads. The sensor classification probability refers to how likely it is for a terrorist to 
classify a blue agent. We ignored false-positive classification probability, which means a 
terrorist agent classifies a blue agent as terrorist (or neutral) but it is actually not a 
terrorist. We vary the classification probability of a terrorist from 0.3 to 0.7. 
d. Average Time Between Detection 
The average time between detection (TerroristTimeBetwDet) applies for terrorist 
squads. The average time between detections factor corresponds to the detection 
capability of a terrorist. As we explained under the average time between detection 
section of controllable factors, we use this factor to obtain more realistic results in terms 
of detection time. We vary this value from 300 to 700 seconds for a terrorist. 
e. Number of Partisan Agents  
The number of partisan agents (PartNumber) is the count of partisans living in the 
cities. We vary this value from 5 to 10. 
f. Partisan Communication Delay 
The partisan communication delay (PartComDelay) is the time in which a partisan 
can pass information on aircraft activity to a terrorist squad. We use the partisan 
communication delay factor to represent the communication delay between the partisans 
and the terrorists through the communication latency capability in MANA. We vary this 
value from 500 to 900 seconds. 
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B. NEARLY ORTHOGONAL LATIN HYPERCUBE DESIGNS 
We explore the effects of 28 different factors in this thesis. These are sensor, 
weapon, and time-related factors of the agents. Some of these factors have a wide range 
between their maximum and minimum levels. It is impossible to run our model for each 
possible combination of the factor levels because we would have to run many billions of 
combinations, depending on the number of decimals of each factor. It would take too 
long to complete our simulation, even using a supercomputer. As a result, we need to use 
an advanced design of experiment technique to reduce the computation time, but at the 
same time cover a broad section of the input space. For this purpose, we used a nearly 
orthogonal Latin hypercube (NOLH) design. The NOLH design was developed by 
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas M. Cioppa during his doctoral studies at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey, CA [50]. The NOLH design “combines 
orthogonal Latin hypercube and uniform designs to create designs having near 
orthogonality and excellent space-filling properties.” [50] 
We used an Excel spreadsheet developed by Professor Susan Sanchez at the NPS 
Simulation Experiments and Efficient Designs (SEED) Center [51] to generate a NOLH 
design for this thesis. The user specifies factor names, and maximum and minimum 
values of factor levels as inputs. The spreadsheet provides a NOLH design in the units of 
the problem. This worksheet allows the user to select between different designs 
depending on the number of factors, with a minimum of seven and maximum of 29 
factors. For other numbers of factors, NOLHs can be generated using the mixed-integer 
programming algorithm of Hernandez [52]. We used the spreadsheet for up to 29 factors 
in this thesis. Figure 19 illustrates a partial screenshot of the NOLH design for the 28 
factors varied in this thesis. 
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Figure 19.  Partial screenshot of NOLH design spreadsheet for 29 factor design, 
after [51]. 
Sanchez’s spreadsheet provides 257 different combinations of factor values, using 
the ranges of the factor levels. In other words, it selects 257 different design points (DP) 
among the entire set of input combinations, which provides an efficient design while 
covering a broad section of input space. This property of NOLH designs is called the 
space-filling property. We can visualize the space-filling property of our NOLH designs 
by using a scatterplot matrix. Figure 20 depicts a partial screenshot of the scatterplot 
matrix for the factors used in our model. The entire scatterplot matrix for all factors is 
included in Appendix A. The diagonal of the scatterplot shows the factor names while the 
ranges are shown on left side. The figure shows that each pair of factors is sampled 
throughout the possible region. 
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Figure 20.  Partial screenshot of the scatterplot matrix for the factors. 
Another property of our NOLH designs is near-orthogonality. Near-orthogonality 
guarantees the factors are not confounded. Orthogonality of a design can be examined 
through a color map of correlations, as shown in Figure 21. A red color refers to a strong 
positive correlation, while blue implies a strong negative correlation between the factors. 
The grayer the diagram is, the nearer to orthogonality. The diagonal line in the diagram 






of factors are close to zero. 
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Figure 21.  Color map on correlations for the factors used in design. 
C. MODEL RUNNING PROCESS 
Sanchez’s spreadsheet provides 257 different combinations of factor values, in 
other words design points (DPs), using the ranges of factor levels. As a result, we 
obtained a DOE file. We entered the base case MANA scenario, in eXtensible Markup 
Language (XML) format, and the DOE file, in comma-separated value (CSV) format into 
a software program called XStudy, written by SEED Center research associate Steve 
Upton [51]. XStudy enables the user to map each column in the design file to a specific 
parameter element in MANA, using XPaths. An XPath is a reference to a specific 
location in an xml file. We also entered other details about the study design, such as the 
version of MANA and the number of replications per design point, into this tool, yielding 
a single “study.xml” file. 
This study file is used by another program called oldmcdata, also written by Steve 
Upton, which programmatically modifies the MANA XML file, producing a separate 
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XML scenario file for each design point [51]. We used an open source software package 
called Condor, available from the University of Wisconsin (http://www.cs.wisc.edu/
condor), to distribute and manage the MANA jobs in parallel across a set of available 
processors. The oldmcdata software creates the set of submit.dat files needed by condor, 
one for each design point job. A job consists of a set of replications for one design point 
excursion. 
Upon completion of the runs, oldmcdata includes a data post-processor that 
combines the MANA summary file output from the individual design point excursions 
into one CSV file, ready for use with any data analysis software package. This output file 
contains input factor settings from the DOE, the random number seed, and outputs for 
each replication. The SEED Center high performance computing cluster configuration 
used for these runs was composed of 128 Windows processors, with 2 to 4 GB RAM per 
processor. 
Our model is a time-stepped, agent-based, stochastic model. Because it is a 
stochastic process, we need to make a number of replications for each design point to 
capture the desired precision of the results and see a range of outcomes. We determined 
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In our calculations, we use a α value of 0.05 and a β value 0.10.  α  and β  are 
also called the type I and type II error probability, respectively. We also want to capture a 
practical difference of three terrorists killed.  σ is the standard deviation obtained from 
the initial 100 replications of the baseline scenario. After plugging in all required 
information, we come out with approximately 50 replications per DP. Figure 22 




Figure 22.  Number of replications required as a function of desired practical 
difference. 
After multiplying the number of replications required per DP (50) by the number 
of DP (257), we get 12,850 runs per scenario. Finally, we multiplied this number by 
number of scenarios (8), and we end up with a total of 102,800 simulated engagements. 
These runs would have taken over 600 days to complete if we used a single processor 
computer. However, we used a 128-processor cluster, which took approximately 15 days 
to complete all of the runs. After 15 days, we received the output in a CSV file format, 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, we define the measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and the analysis 
tool that we used in this thesis. After providing general summary statistics for our MOEs, 
we compare scenarios in detail using different comparison techniques. Afterward, we fit 
regression models to identify influential factors. 
A. MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS 
The U.S. DOD defines a measure of effectiveness (MOE) as “a criterion used to 
assess changes in system behavior, capability, or operational environment that is tied to 
measuring the attainment of an end state, achievement of an objective, or creation of an 
effect.” [22] The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the effectiveness of the use of 
UCAVs against active terrorists in rough terrain. We also want to explore the 
effectiveness of using F-16s and UCAVs together. Therefore, we have three different 
MOEs in this thesis to answer the research questions and gain operational insights. 
First, we measure the total number of terrorists killed (MOE 1), in other words, 
the number of red casualties at the end of each run. As we explained in Chapter III, there 
are 120 terrorists separated into three groups. Each air-to-ground strike asset engages one 
of the terrorist groups and kills a portion of this group. MOE 1 is necessary but not 
sufficient to understand the effectiveness of UCAVs because UCAVs can carry smaller 
air-to-ground weapons compared to F-16s. We need to define another MOE to better 
explore the effectiveness of the UCAVs. 
Second, we measure the time to complete the mission (MOE 2), i.e., counter the 
terrorists. The time is a very important MOE because, as we mentioned in early chapters, 
terrorists are well adapted to rough terrain, so they can travel long distances in relatively 
short time periods. Even if they cannot reach their final destinations, they can pass 
through villages or other military facilities where they can conduct attacks and kill many 
people. 
Third, we measure the probability that the terrorists (red) reach their goal (MOE 
3). That is, the probability that at least one of the terrorist groups attacks a blue battalion. 
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In some of the runs, blue forces cannot detect or classify one, two, or all of the terrorist 
groups, which means that the undetected terrorist groups attack a blue battalion. If any of 
the blue battalions are attacked, it means a mission failure for blue and a mission success 
for red. Therefore, we created a column named red reached goal. If any of the terrorist 
squads remain undetected until the end of a run of a maximum 90,000 time steps, we 
enter a “1” in the corresponding cell for that column. Otherwise, we give a value of “0.”  
This column provides an estimated probability for each design point in each scenario 
when we average the values over the replications. 
B. ANALYSIS TOOL 
The only analysis tool that we use in this thesis is JMP, which was first launched 
in 1989 by SAS Company and is available for purchase at http://www.jmp.com [53]. JMP 
software helps the user interactively visualize and analyze the data. It makes importing 
and processing the data easy as well as performs the appropriate analysis techniques. JMP 
also has drag-and-drop interface and dynamically linked graphs, which allows users to 
discover more from their data. 
The user can apply various statistical techniques such as, linear and nonlinear 
regression, model comparisons, partition trees, Gaussian processing, and time series. In 
this thesis, we used JMP software 11.2.0 to analyze our simulation output. 
C. INITIAL DATA ANALYSIS BY SCENARIOS 
In this section, we provide the general results obtained from the histograms, 
summary statistics, and box plots for the MOEs across our eight scenarios. The detailed 
figures for the distributions of each MOE, including histograms and summary statistics, 
are provided in Appendix B. In this section, we provide only a table that summarizes all 
of the results (see Table 8). The highest and the lowest values for each MOE are 
highlighted in Table 8. 
We also provide box plots for the MOEs categorized by scenarios. Boxplots show 
the distribution of the data in one dimension and are appropriate tools for comparing the 
distributions of continuous variables between categorical groups. As we can see from 
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Figure 23, in a box plot, the median is bounded by the 25% and 75% percentiles. The 
most outlying observations are defined as outliers or extreme outliers. JMP discriminates 
between the data and the outliers, but not the extreme outliers. 
Table 8.   The mean and standard deviation of three MOEs for eight different 
scenarios. 
 MOE1 MOE2 MOE3 
Scenario Mean Std.Dev. Mean(sec) Std.Dev.(sec) Mean Std.Dev. 
Baseline 35.61 11.67 58,757 23,937 0.18 0.30 
Alt1 30.68 8.00 53,051 23,132 0.09 0.22 
Alt2 32.31 8.17 54,580 23,201 0.24 0.24 
Alt3 30.95 8.85 58,505 24,032 0.18 0.31 
Alt4 31.90 8.26 53,855 22,549 0.09 0.21 
Alt5 32.77 8.74 63,290 22,202 0.21 0.31 
Alt6 33.84 9.27 56,616 22,141 0.13 0.26 
Alt7 32.17 9.64 61,178 24,234 0.22 0.33 
 
Figure 23.  Key for reading the boxplots [54]. 
We will make general comparisons and provide general insights in this section, 
but the detailed statistical comparisons are provided in the further sections. 
1. MOE (1): The Number of Terrorists Killed 
According to the summary statistics in Table 8 and the box plots on the left side 
of Figure 24, the number of terrorists killed is the highest in the baseline scenario. Recall 
that in the baseline scenario we allocate three F-16s to the three regions on the Turkish-
Iraqi border. The alternative scenarios 5, 6, and 7 have two F-16s, while alternative 
scenarios 2, 3, and 4 have only one F-16, and alternative scenario 1 does not have any F-
16s. The F-16s can carry more effective weapons than the UCAVs in our model. 
Therefore, the baseline and the alternative scenarios 5, 6, and 7 have a larger mean 
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number of terrorists killed compared to the others. The alternative scenario 1 has the 
smallest mean number of red casualties. When we look at the box plots for the mean 
number of red casualties in Figure 24, we see small differences between all of the 
scenarios, but we cannot discriminate them correctly because the means are very close to 
each other and the variations are large. In other words, there may be statistical differences 
between the scenarios but we cannot easily see them by only looking at the box plots. 
Note: the variation is high because each scenario is examined at 257 different design 
points. 
These results are not surprising because we always use three air-to-ground strike 
assets in each run. Therefore, we expect more casualties when we use more powerful 
weapons. However, these results show that using even three UCAVs rather than three F-
16s does not yield extremely small red casualties. Moreover, the baseline scenario has 
only three more red casualties than Alt2, in which one F-16 and two UCAVs are used. 
Looking at other MOEs provides the decision-maker better insight. 
 
Figure 24.  Boxplot for mean number of terrorists killed (left) and mean time 
spent to complete the mission (right) by scenario. 
2. MOE (2): The Time to Complete the Run 
According to Table 8, alternative scenario 1, in which three UCAVs are allocated 
to the three regions, has the lowest mean time to counter all three terrorist groups. In 
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other words, if we use three UCAVs along the Turkish-Iraqi border rather than three F-
16s, we prevent the terrorist groups from attacking blue assets in a shorter time. 
Moreover, the scenarios in which we use two UCAVs, alternative scenarios 2, 3, and 4, 
have shorter mean times than the ones in which we use one UCAV, alternative scenarios 
5, 6, and 7. Alternative scenarios 6 and 3 are exceptions for this generalization. However, 
similar to MOE 1, as shown in the box plots on the right side of Figure 24, the variations 
are large also for MOE 2. Therefore, we cannot say that differences between the means 
are statistically significant by only looking at the summary statistics and the box plots. 
3. MOE (3): The Probability that the Red Reaches its Goal 
Similar to the time MOE, alternative scenarios that consist of two UCAVs and 
one F-16 have a smaller probability that the terrorists reach their goal than the ones that 
have one UCAV and two F-16s. According to the summary statistics in Table 8, 
alternative scenario 1, which has three UCAVs, has the smallest probability for red 
reaching the goal. Similar to MOE 2, alternative scenarios 3 and 6 are exceptions for that 
generalization. The baseline scenario has a higher probability than the two and three 
UCAV scenarios, with the exception of alternative scenario 3. 
 
Figure 25.  Boxplot for mean probability of red reaching goal, by scenario. 
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We can see the differences between the means and the variations from the box 
plots provided in Figure 25. In contrast to MOEs 1 and 2, MOE 3 has larger differences 
between the variances. Alternative scenarios 1, 2, 4, and 6 (i.e., using more UCAVs) 
seem more preferable according to the box plots. 
The summary statistics and the box plots provide general information about the 
data. However, we need to apply different comparison techniques in order to figure out 
statistical differences in detail between the scenarios. Therefore, we perform t-test 
comparisons of the means for each MOE and scenario in the following section. 
D. DETAILED T-TEST COMPARISONS FOR THE MEANS OF THE MOES 
A t-test is one of the hypothesis-testing techniques that we can use. The 
information in this section comes from T. W. Lucas’s statistics class notes. A hypothesis 
is “a statement or claim about a population or populations, often concerning the 
parameters.” [55]  In hypothesis-testing, there are two hypotheses of interest: the null 
hypothesis ( 0H ) and the alternative hypothesis ( aH ). The null hypothesis is “the claim 
that is initially assumed to be true” [55], and the alternative hypothesis is “an assertion 
that is contrary to the null hypothesis. Possible conclusions from hypothesis-testing 
analysis are reject 0H  or fail to reject 0H .” [55]. Equations (2) and (3) illustrate the null 
and the alternative hypothesis testing, respectively, where µ1 and µ2 are the means of two 
populations. 
 0 1 2: 0H µ µ− =  (2) 
 1 2: 0aH µ µ− ≠  (3) 
First, we calculate a test statistic using a specific significance level (α ). If the test 
statistic falls in the rejection region, we reject the null hypothesis; otherwise, we say that 
there is not enough evidence to reject, or in other words, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis. A test statistic (see Equation [4]) is “a function of the sample data on which 
the decision is to be based.” [55]  A rejection region is “the set of all statistics values for 
which 0H  will be rejected” and a significance level is “the probability that we will 
wrongly reject 0H .” [55] 
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Another way to decide whether to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis is to 
look at the p-values. A p-value is “the probability, if 0H  were true, of obtaining a test 
statistics value as extreme or more extreme than what is observed.” [55]  We reject 0H  if 
the p-value is less than the significance level (α ). Figure 26 depicts the rejection regions 
and the interpretation of a p-value. 
 
Figure 26.  Rejection regions (left) and interpretation of p-value (right) [55]. 
We use JMP to test the hypotheses for the means of the MOEs. Our null 
hypothesis is that the sample mean of a scenario for our MOEs is equal to the sample 
mean of the other scenarios. In other words, there is no statistical difference between the 
scenarios in terms of the means of the MOEs. Our alternative hypothesis is that the 
scenarios are statistically different. We always use the significance level (α ) of 0.05 for 
all calculations in this thesis, which means if the p-value is less than 0.05, we reject the 
null hypothesis. Thus, the two compared scenarios are statistically different. Otherwise, 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis, which means that the compared scenarios are not 
statistically different. The following sections make a t-test comparison of the scenarios in 
terms of our three MOEs. 
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1. MOE (1): The Number of Terrorists Killed 
The mean number of terrorists killed is very close in all of the scenarios, but there 
are both practical and statistical differences between some of the scenarios. A ractical 
significance means that the result is important to the decision-maker. For instance, for an 
air-to-ground operation like we simulate in this thesis, the decision-maker can say that 
killing one more terrorist is important, which means the practical difference is one. If 
killing 10 more terrorists makes a difference for the decision-maker, then the practical 
difference is 10. However, “no matter how small the effect, if we take a big enough 
sample, we can make it statistically significantly different.” [55] 
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Figure 27.  T-test for comparison of mean number of terrorists killed. 
Figure 27 shows the t-test comparison between the scenarios for a significance 
level of 0.05 in terms of the mean number of terrorists killed, or red casualties. The 
connecting letters report section from Figure 27 illustrates the means and the general 
comparison between the scenarios. If the compared levels (scenarios) have different 
letters, it means that they are statistically different in terms of the mean number of 
terrorists killed. Based on that section of the graph, the baseline scenario is different from 
all other scenarios. In addition, the baseline scenario has the highest mean for red 
 70 
casualties while the alternative scenario 1 has the smallest. That is, three F-16s results in 
the most terrorists killed, while 3 three UCAVs results in the fewest. 
The ordered differences report section provides more detailed information, such 
as the p-values for tests on all mean comparisons. Circled p-values are less than the 
significance level of 0.05, which means the corresponding scenario pairs on the left are 
statistically different. In other word, the scenario pairs above the horizontal red line are 
statistically significantly different. 
As far as a practical difference is concerned, which will be determined by the 
decision-maker, we can say the following. If we assume that killing four more terrorists is 
important for the decision-maker, then we can say that the baseline scenario is practically 
different form alternative scenarios 1 and 3. A more detailed comparison report for MOE 
1 is provided in Appendix C. 
2. MOE (2): The Time to Complete the Run 
The time to complete a run is also an important MOE. Terrorists are adapted to 
the rough terrain in Turkish-Iraqi border, and they can travel relatively long distances in a 
short period of time. They can attack every village or military facility that they pass 
through during this time period even if they cannot reach their final destination. 
Therefore, we want to prevent them from proceeding in the shortest possible time. 
Figure 28 provides information about t-test comparison of the scenarios in terms 
of the time to counter the terrorists for the α level of 0.05. The connecting letters section 
points out that there are statistical differences between some of the scenarios, such as 
alternative scenarios 5 and 7 and the baseline scenario, or between the baseline scenario 
and alternative scenarios 1, 2, 4, and 6. The scenario pairs above the horizontal red line 
are statistically different because the corresponding p-values are less than 0.05. Those 
that are above the horizontal blue line are considered practically different, assuming 
5,000 seconds (approximately 1.5 hours) makes an important difference for the decision-
maker. On the other hand, the baseline scenario and the alternative scenarios 3, 6, and 7 
are the same in terms of the mean time to complete the run. The main takeaway is that 
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more UCAVs reduces the time to counter the terrorists. A more detailed comparison 
report is provided in Appendix D. 
 
Figure 28.  T-test for comparison of mean time to complete run. 
3. MOE (3): The Probability that the Red Reaches Its Goal  
Figure 29 provides the information about the t-test comparison for the scenarios in 
terms of the mean probability that terrorists reach their goal. The main goal of the 




Figure 29.  T-test for comparison of mean probability that red reaches goal. 
According to the Figure 29, the paired scenarios that have a p-value less than 0.05 
are statistically different. The baseline scenario and alternative scenarios 1, 2, and 4 are 
statistically different, while the baseline scenario and alternative scenarios 1 and 4 are 
practically different as well, if the decision-maker takes the threshold probability as 0.08. 
On the other hand, we can say form Figure 29 that the baseline scenario and 
alternative scenarios 3, 5, 6, and 7 are the same in terms of the probability that the red 
reaches the goal. The main takeaway here is that using more UCAVs reduces the 
probability that the terrorists reach their goal. This follows from having more sensors 
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along the border and a quicker response time. It is important to note that we assume that a 
terrorist group withdraws after suffering casualties. A more detailed comparison report is 
provided in Appendix E. 
4. Insights from the Scenario Comparisons 
We define three different MOEs in order to look at the problem from different 
perspectives and provide comprehensive insight to the decision-maker. From the result of 
the initial data analysis and the scenario comparisons, we can say that the advantages and 
disadvantages of the scenarios differ depending on the MOEs. The decision-maker should 
decide whether he/she wants to get more red casualties, or eliminate the terrorists as 
quickly as possible, or decrease the probability of being attacked by the terrorists. 
In general, F-16s are better at causing more red casualties, but UCAVs kill 
quicker and are better at preventing terrorists from attacking blue. The reason for this is 
that F-16s have more powerful weapons, but UCAVs have more sophisticated sensors 
(and are near the border) so they can detect, classify, and attack terrorists in a relatively 
shorter time. More specifically, the scenarios where we use two F-16s and one UCAV are 
more advantageous for killing red than the scenarios with one F-16 and two UCAVs. On 
the other hand, the scenarios with two UCAVs are preferable in terms of MOEs 2 and 3. 
We recommend the decision-maker to use at least two UCAVs in that area rather 
than using three F-16s. We think that decreasing the probability of red’s attacking blue is 
more important than the number of red casualties. We also want to assign one of the 
UCAVs to the region two because statistical results show that using UCAVs in region 
two increases the performance in terms of MOE 2 and 3. In other words, using F-16s in 
region two decreases the performance in terms of MOE 2 and 3. This may be because of 
the terrain effects in region 2, but we need to make further investigations to understand 
the actual reason, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In sum, using three UCAVs or a combination of two UCAVs and one F-16 seems 
preferable for a decision-maker. Now, we want to know what kind of characteristics the 
F-16s and the UCAVs should have in order to obtain better results. For this purpose, we 
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perform regression analyses to find significant factors that have an influence on the 
response. 
E. LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
A regression analysis is used to figure out the effects of, and the relationship 
between, the input factors and the response variables. A regression fits a mathematical 
model and tries to minimize the square distances to the observed data. The general 
mathematical equation for the linear regression is shown in Equation (5) [56]. 
 0 1 1 2 2 1 1... p pY X X Xβ β β β ε− −= + + + + +  (5) 
In Equation (5), , 0,1, 2,..., p 1i iβ = −  are unknown parameters and 0β  is called the 
intercept term.  Y is called the response and p 1,...,XiX − are the predictors.  ε is an error 
term, often assumed to be normal [56]. 
In the following section, we examine the significantly influential input factors, 
including two-way interactions and nonlinear effects, on the mean number of terrorists 
killed (MOE 1), the time to complete the run (MOE 2), and the probability that red 
reaches the goal (MOE 3). However, we only explain the models for the mean number of 
red casualties in detail supported with graphs and tables. The results for other MOEs are 
summarized, and the detailed results are provided in Appendix F. 
Two approaches were considered to fit regression models to the factors we varied. 
The first approach was to fit the model, grouped by both scenario and the design point. In 
this first approach, we obtained very low R2 values indicating a poor model fit. The 
second approach was to fit the model, collapsing across the scenarios for every design 
point. The second approach gave us higher R2 values indicating better model fits with 
fewer degrees of freedom. Moreover, the most influential variables and the order of 
importance of these variables were exactly the same for both approaches. In addition, 
with fewer rows of data, the graphs are easier to interpret. Thus, we preferred to use the 
second approach that uses the summary data file with 257 rows of data. 
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1. Main Effects Model 
In our thesis, we use stepwise regression in JMP to fit the mean number of 
terrorists killed using only the input factors as the candidate influential terms in the 
model, also called a main effects model. Main effects models are easy to understand and 
interpret because there are no quadratic terms or interactions in the model. Figure 30 
illustrates the statistical results of the basic model. 
 
Figure 30.  Results for main effects model for mean number of terrorists killed. 
The “Summary of Fit” table in Figure 30 provides information about how much 
the variance is explained by the regression model, which is represented by RSquare (R2). 
The “Actual by Predicted Plot” visualizes how well the model fits the data. The “Sorted 
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Parameter Estimates” table provides information about the factors and the model. The 
factors used in the model are listed under the “Term” column. These terms correspond to 
iX  in equation (5). The “Estimate” column includes the multipliers of iX , which 
correspond to iβ  in equation (5) whereas the “Std.Error” column shows the uncertainties. 
The “t Ratio” and the “Prob>|t|” columns show if the terms are necessary for the model 
and how much influence they have. If the “Prob>|t|” value or p-value is greater than the 
selected significance level of the model, which is 0.05 in this thesis, then this term is 
significant. An example of the interpretation of the model is the following. A one unit 
increase in F-16’s hit probability (F16HitProb) causes 8.94 unit increases in the mean 
number of terrorists killed. 
According to the results, there are eight input factors that have a significant effect 
on the mean number of terrorists killed for a significance level of 0.05. The most 
significant terms in the model are the weapon range and the hit probability of the F-16s 
and the UCAVs, and the sensor classification range of the UAVs and the UCAVs. The 
detection range of the UAVs also appears to be significant in the model. 
The R2 value is 0.54, which means 54% of the variance is explained in the model. 
Determining a good value of R2 depends on the area of application. For example, “in the 
biological and social sciences, variables tend to be more weakly correlated and there is a 
lot of noise. We would expect lower values of R2 in these areas. Some experience with 
the particular area is necessary to judge the R2 well.” [57]  In reality, there are a lot of 
uncontrollable factors in air-to-ground operations, such as weather, terrain, temperature, 
moisture, and system malfunctions, etc. Therefore, it is impossible to predict the future 
perfectly for this kind of operations. In order to make our model as realistic as possible, 
we adjusted the range of the factors in a way that we can include those noise factors in 
the model. Moreover, we modeled the entire Turkish-Iraqi border, which is very large 
compared to the agents on the ground or in the air. Therefore, there is a lot of variation in 
detection and classification of terrorists during the simulation because of the LOS 
calculations (e.g., a small move of an agent can make it invisible to the sensors). As a 
result, lower values of R2 are expected in our model. 
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R2 is not the only factor for deciding whether a model is good or bad. We also 
need to check some assumptions using the regression diagnostics, because the estimation 
and inference from the regression model depends on these assumptions [57]. Those 
assumptions are: 
1. The error term ε  has mean of zero. 
2. The error term ε  has constant variance. 
3. The errors are normally distributed. 
4. The errors are uncorrelated. 
5. The relationship between the response and the regression variables is 
correct. 
6. The regression variables are independent. [58] 
These assumptions can be checked graphically or analytically. Assumptions 1 
through 4 are related to the residuals. Figure 31 shows the information about the residuals 
for the main effects model. 
 
Figure 31.  Useful statistics and plots for residuals of main effects model. 
The error term has the mean of 1.145x10-14, which is very close to zero. Constant 
variance assumption can be checked from “Residuals by Predicted Plot.”  We want all of 
the data to spread out equally around the dotted blue line in the graph. The residual by 
predicted plot is not perfect in our model. The normality of the error terms can be 
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checked visually by looking at the “Normal Quantile Plot” or analytically by conducting 
Shapiro-Wilk test. The normal quantile plot seems good except on the edges, but we do 
not pass the Shapiro-Wilk test because the p-value is less than 0.05. Therefore, we 
perform a Box-Cox transformation on the response variable to fix the constant variance 
and satisfy the normality assumption for the residuals. The Box-Cox transformation 
suggests a lambda value of 0.2, which we can also see from the graph in Figure 32. 
 
Figure 32.  Graphical illustration of the Box-Cox transformation in the JMP. 
After a Box-Cox transformation, we fit a new model using the new response 
variable with the power transformation. The influential factors on the response variable 
remain the same with previous model, and the R2 value increases from 0.54 to 0.55 (see 
Figure 35). As shown in Figure 33, the residual by predicted plot seems better than the 
previous plot, which shows that the error terms has constant variance. Moreover, the 
normal quantile plot is good, and we also pass the Shapiro-Wilk test because our p-value 
is greater than the significance level of 0.05, indicating the normality assumption is also 
met. In addition, the error term has a mean value that is even closer to zero than the one 
in the previous model. 
 79 
 
Figure 33.  Statistics and plots for residuals after Box-Cox transformation on 
response variable. 
After the first three assumptions are met, we check whether the errors are 
uncorrelated. This assumption can be checked visually by looking at the residual by 
predicted plot. We would like to see no evident sequence of points [58], which is the case 
for the plot in Figure 33. We can check the assumptions 5 and 6 from the scatter plot 
visually [58]. The scatter plot that we provide in Appendix A satisfies these assumptions. 
In addition, we want to see whether there is any influential point by looking at the Cook’s 
distance values. Figure 34 shows that all of the Cook’s distance values are less than one, 
indicating no influential values. 
 
Figure 34.  Cook’s distance values indicate that there are no influential points. 
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The final main effects model is provided in Figure 35. Notice that the new model 
has the same influential factors on the response variable with slightly different t-ratios 
and p-values. The R2 value is also greater than the first model. 
 
Figure 35.  Results for main affects model after Box-Cox transformation. 
2. Main Effects Model for MOE 2 and MOE 3 
We also fit the time (MOE 2) and the probability that red reaches the goal (MOE 
3) using only the main effects. We use linear regression for MOE 2, but logistic 
regression for MOE 3 since the response is binary. The summary statistics, parameter 
estimates, and the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) curve for logistic regression 
are provided in Appendix F. 
The results of the linear regression for MOE 2 shows that the most significant 
factors in the model are the sensor classification range, the time between detections, the 
sensor classification probability of the UAVs, and the time between detections of the 
UCAVs. As the sensor capabilities of the UAVs and the UCAVs increases, the time 
decreases. Different than with MOE 1, use of the F-16s does not have any influence on 
the time to complete the run. That is, the sensors of the systems on the border (i.e., UAVs 
and UCAVs) are the most important variables in quickly detecting, classifying, and 
countering the terrorists.  
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The results of the logistic regression for MOE 3 show that the most influential 
factors are the UAV-related factors, such as UAV sensor classification range and 
probability. However, the UCAV and the F-16-related factors also have a strong effect on 
the response as well as the terrorist-related factors. 
3. Insights from the Main Effects Model 
The main effects models show that all of the air assets that we use in the model 
have a strong influence on MOE 1 and MOE 3 in some way. However, the F-16 does not 
have a significant influence on the time (MOE 2). The most influential factors are related 
to the weapons and the sensor capabilities of the air assets. Other factors, such as speed 
and scramble time, appear to be insignificant for MOE 1. Moreover, there are no 
uncontrollable factors that affect the response in the main effects model for MOE 1 and 
MOE 2. In addition, we do not see any direct sensor-related factors of the F-16s in the 
model for MOE 1 and MOE 2, but hit probability can be considered as sensor related in 
reality (e.g., as sensor capability increases, the hit probability also increases). As a result, 
the decision-makers should focus on increasing the sensor capabilities of the UAVs and 
the UCAVs. They also should use more powerful weapons for the operations in that area. 
4. Second Order Model 
In addition to the main effects model, we also consider the effects of the 
interactions between the main input factors as well as the quadratic terms. Using stepwise 
regression in JMP, we started to construct our model by adding the quadratic terms and 
the interactions. In order to keep the model as simple as possible, we excluded the terms 
that make no sense for the model and the terms that have very small influence on the R2 
value. In addition, if a main effect is included in a quadratic or interaction term, we keep 
this factor in the model to achieve the model hierarchy even if it does not have a 
significant effect for the model. The summary statistics, actual by predicted plot, and 
sorted parameter estimates for the second order model is depicted in Figure 36.   
The second order model has an R2 value of 0.68, which means the significant 
terms explain roughly 68% of the variability in the mean number of red causalities. 
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Figure 36.  Results for main effects model for mean number of terrorists killed. 
Notice that the primary factors that exist in the main effects model also appear to 
be the most significant factors in the second order model. Besides those factors, the time 
between detection for the UAV and the UCAV are significant in the new model. 
Moreover, terrorist classification range also has a significant influence on the number of 
terrorists killed. Specifically, as their classification range increases, so does their 
survivability. There is no quadratic term in the second order model, but some interactions 
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between the controllable factors or the controllable and uncontrollable factors are in the 
model. 
5. Second Order Model for MOE 2 
We also fit the time to complete the run using the main effects and the second 
order terms. The summary statistics and the parameter estimates are provided in 
Appendix F. 
Similar to the main effects model, the results of the second order model for the 
MOE 2 show that the most significant factors in the model are the sensor classification 
range, the time between detections, the sensor classification probability of the UAVs and 
the time between detections of the UCAVs. As the sensor capabilities of the UAVs and 
the UCAVs increases, the time decreases. Different then the main effects model, use of 
the F-16s also has an influence on the response. The interaction between the F-16’s time 
between detections and the sensor classification range of partisans are in the model. 
6. Insights from the Second Order Model 
Similar to the main effects models, in the second order models the most 
significant factors are related to the weapon and the sensor capabilities of the air assets. 
Different from the main effects models, the second order models contain also factors 
related to the red agents, such as sensor capabilities of terrorists. Also, other 
uncontrollable factors, such as communication capability of terrorists and partisans, are in 
the model. Therefore, preventing terrorists from communicating with civil supporters in 
the cities may increase the number of red casualties. UCAV speed, which does not exist 
in the main effects model, is also influential on the response. According to the results, the 
UCAVs should fly slower to increase the number of red casualties. 
F. REGRESSION TREE ANALYSIS 
Regression trees, also known as partition trees, are another way to analyze the 
data and explore the influences of the factors on the response variable. The partition tree 
is easy to understand and interpret because of its tree structure. The recursive partitioning 
regression algorithm is the following. 
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First, we partition a predictor by selecting a point within the range of this 
predictor to decide from where to split. Second, we calculate the mean of the response 
variable in that partition. We apply the same procedure for each partition. Then, we fit a 
model for each partition and choose the one that minimizes the residual sum of squares 
(RSS). Finally, we continue subpartitioning the partitions in a recursive manner [56]. The 
overall model after each split is shown in a tree structure. 
We perform a partition tree analysis for the mean number of terrorists killed using 
JMP. Figure 37 illustrates the first six splits of the tree model. We read a partition tree 
from top to bottom. Each box contains the name of the factor and the value for optimal 
split. The mean and the standard deviation of the number of terrorists killed are also 
included in each box as well as the number of observations for that partition. 
The results of the partition tree analysis support the linear regression results since 
the most significant factors are the same for both. The F-16 weapon range of 6047 meters 
is the first split in the tree. The second and the third splits are the UCAV weapon range of 
4180 and the UAV sensor classification range of 6547, respectively. Notice that these 
factors are also the most significant factors in both the main effects and the second order 
linear regression model. We prefer the branches on the right because we want to have 
higher red casualties. The red circle shows the most preferable configuration for first six 
splits where F-16s have a weapon range greater than 6047 meters and the UCAVs have a 
weapon range greater than 4180 meters. Note: recall that our weapon ranges are inflated 
since we spread our terrorists more than they would in the real world. 
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Figure 37.  First six splits of partition tree model for number of terrorists killed. 
Although the R2 value increases as we continue splitting, we stop on the 20th split 
and get an R2 value of 0.62. We provide the tree model for the first 15 splits in Appendix 
G. Figure 38 displays the improvement of R2 value with number of splits and the 
contributions of the factors to the explanatory power of the tree model. 
 
Figure 38.  Improvement of R2 value with number of splits (right) and 
contributions of factors to explanatory power of tree model (left). 
The partition tree results show a strong correlation with the main effects and the 
second order linear regression results. The sensor- and weapon-related factors are mostly 
influential factors. As we continue splitting, other terms related to the blue or red forces 
are added to the tree with a small effect. Overall, having more powerful weapons and 






We analyze the effectiveness of the use of UCAVs in conjunction with the 
manned aircraft to counter active terrorists in rough terrain in this thesis. We try to figure 
out whether replacing or combining the manned aircraft with UCAVs is effective for air-
to-ground operations in a rough terrain. For this purpose, we build a simulation model 
and run 102,800 simulated air-to-ground attacks comprising eight different scenarios of 
manned aircraft and UAV combinations. The results are based on our assumption that 
three air-to-ground strike assets will always be used. Therefore, it is impossible to cover 
every aspect of these kinds of operations, but we provide significant insights to the 
decision-maker. After performing data analysis techniques on the output, we explore 
useful results for the effectiveness of UCAVs as well as the significant factors that have a 
strong influence on the outcome. 
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The results of this research provide answers to the following research questions. 
(1) How might UCAVs enhance Turkey’s ability to secure its border 
characterized by rough geographical conditions? 
In general, the results of this research show that using the UCAVs enhances 
Turkey’s ability to secure the southeastern border. The scenario comparisons point out 
that the scenarios in which we use more UCAVs, are statistically different in favor of 
UCAVs in terms of the time to complete the mission and the probability that the terrorists 
reach their goal. The scenarios where we use more F-16s are preferable in terms of the 
number of terrorists killed. However, some of the scenarios that have two UCAVs and 
one F-16 (Alternatives 2 and 4) have slightly less mean red casualties than the baseline. 
Therefore, the UCAVs may kill fewer terrorist compared to the current methods, but we 
prevent them from attacking the blue more quickly and with higher probability. 
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(2) What combination of UCAVs and UAVs provides the same or better 
effectiveness than the combination of manned aircraft and UAVs currently 
in use? 
The only scenario that we use UCAV and UAV combination only is alternative 
scenario 1, in which we allocate three UCAVs to the Turkish-Iraqi border. When the 
response variable is the number of terrorists killed, the alternative scenario 1 has the 
lowest mean. However, when the response variable is the time to stop terrorists or the 
probability of terrorists’ attacking the blue assets, alternative scenario 1 is preferred over 
the baseline. We think that preventing terrorists from attacking the blue forces is more 
important than killing more terrorists, so we say that using three UCAVs and three UAVs 
provides better effectiveness than the currently used baseline. 
(3) Is there a combination of manned aircraft, UCAVs, and UAVs that 
provides the same or better effectiveness than the manned aircraft and 
UAVs in use? 
The scenario comparisons and the statistics show that using more F-16s than 
UCAVs yields more casualties but a higher probability of the terrorists’ attacking blue. 
The preferred combination of the F-16s and the UCAVs depends on the decision-maker’s 
measure of effectiveness selection. Assuming that the decision-maker always wants to 
keep the blue forces safe, alternative scenarios 2 and 4 appear to have better effectiveness 
than the manned aircraft and UAVs in use. 
(4) What are the advantages and disadvantages of using UCAVs and UAVs 
only, manned aircraft and UAVs only, or UCAVs, manned aircraft, and 
UAVs? 
The first advantage of using UCAVs and UAVs only (Alternative 1) is that we 
stop the terrorists in shortest time and with the highest probability. Therefore, we keep 
the terrorists away from the villages and the military facilities, resulting less blue 
casualties. Parallel to the time, the probability that terrorist attack blue forces also 
decreases. In addition, reducing the risk of the pilot’s life or decreasing the cost can be 
considered as other advantages but these areas are beyond the scope of this thesis. The 
disadvantage of this configuration is having less red casualties. 
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The advantage of using manned aircraft and UAVs only is having more red 
casualties. On the other hand, this combination yields more time and the likelihood of 
being attacked by the terrorists. 
The manned aircraft, UCAVs, and UAVs combination is advantageous in terms 
of resulting in relatively more red casualties in general than the UAVs and UCAVs 
combination. However, it is disadvantageous in terms of giving terrorists more chance to 
attack blue. 
C. OTHER FINDINGS 
• The most common conclusion about the factors is that weapon-related factors have 
a strong influence on the number of terrorists killed while the sensor-related 
factors are the most effective factors on the time of completion and the probability 
that terrorists attack blue. 
• The weapon range of an F-16 and a UCAV are the two most influential factors on 
the number of terrorists killed. The main effects model, the second order model, 
and the first two splits of the partition tree analysis yields the F-16 and the UCAV 
weapon ranges as the most significant factors. Therefore, we should improve 
current air-to-ground weapons if we want to get higher red casualties. 
• The sensor classification range of the UAVs have a strong effect on the number of 
terrorists killed, the time to complete the runs, and the probability that the terrorists 
attack the blue. When we increase the classification range, the number of terrorists 
killed also increases while the time and the probability of being attacked by red 
decreases. Mounting more sophisticated sensors on the UAVs should be 
considered to increase their effectiveness. 
• The hit probabilities of an F-16 and of a UCAV are also two of the most 
significant factors in all regression model fits. As the hit probabilities of these 
assets increases, the number of red casualties increases. Hit probability is mostly 
related to the sensors in real world. Thus, increasing the sensor capabilities also 
increases the probability of hit. However, this relationship was not considered in 
this thesis. 
• According to the main effects and the second order models, the UAV sensor 
classification probability also has a strong positive influence on the number of 
terrorists killed and a strong negative influence on the time to complete the run. 
• Another important factor that increases the number of terrorists killed is the sensor 
classification range of the UCAVs. Both the main effects and the second order 
regression analysis yield this result. Similar to the UAVs, the UCAVs should be 
also configured with advanced sensors that can see farther. 
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• The factors related to the F-16s do not exist in the model for the time to 
completion except in an interaction with the classification of the partisan agents. 
The sensor-related factors of the UAVs and the UCAVs are the ones that have a 
significant influence on the time to completion. We should focus on the UAVs to 
find and kill terrorists in a shorter time. 
• The sensor-related factors of the UAVs and the UCAVs, and the weapon-related 
factors of the UCAVs, are the most influential variables on the probability of 
terrorists’ attacking blue. Similar to the time to completion, we need advanced 
unmanned vehicles more than the manned aircraft to decrease the probability of 
being attacked. 
• The classification range of the terrorists appears to be a significant factor in the 
second order model fit on the time to complete the run. Flying ata  higher altitude 
and/or having more silent aircraft can be considered to reduce this effect. 
• Finally, the detection ranges of the terrorists and the partisans have a significant 
influence on the probability that terrorists attack blue. Thus, preventing partisans 
from communicating with terrorists can be considered. 
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This model is well suited for several excursions that were not done for lack of 
time. The followings are examples of the many potential scenarios, which could be 
covered. 
• One aspect that could be modeled is the impact of the civilians and the 
friendly forces in an urban area. 
• The effect of false-positive detections should be looked at. 
• Another excursion that could be modeled is dedicated UCAV sorties without 
the UAVs and the manned aircraft to ascertain a nearly optimal number of 
UCAVs required for securing the entire border. 
• Based on the restrictive rules of engagement, this research did not explore an 
offensive scenario. Therefore, modeling an offensive air-to-ground attack 
scenario might better inform a decision-maker if conditions were to escalate. 
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APPENDIX A.  SCATTERPLOT MATRIX FOR ALL FACTORS 
The scatterplot matrix for all factors, including controllable and uncontrollable 
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APPENDIX B.  HISTOGRAMS AND SUMMARY STATISTICS 
The following two figures show the distribution of the number of terrorists killed 





The following two figures show the distribution of the time to complete the runs 





The following two figures show the distribution of the probability that the red 
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APPENDIX C.  DETAILED COMPARISON REPORT FOR MOE 1 
The following figures provide the paired t-test comparisons of the scenarios in 







APPENDIX D. DETAILED COMPARISON REPORT FOR MOE 2 
The following figures provide the paired t-test comparisons of the scenarios in 







APPENDIX E.  DETAILED COMPARISON REPORT FOR MOE 3 
The following figures provide the paired t-test comparisons of the scenarios in 







APPENDIX F.  THE REGRESSION MODELS FOR MOE 2  
AND MOE 3 
The following figure depicts the main effects linear regression model fit on the 
time to complete the run (MOE 2). 
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The following figure depicts the main effects logistic regression model fit on the 




The following figure depicts the second order linear regression model fit on the 
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APPENDIX G.  FIFTEEN SPLITS OF THE PARTITION TREE FOR 
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